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The Federal Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries accumulate capital for reinvestment in debt
or equity claims against ultimate investors such as nonfinancial busi-
ness enterprises, governmental units, and purchasers of real property.'
They are called intermediaries because they serve as middlemen be-
tween suppliers of capital-more particularly savers, investors, deposi-
tors, shareholders, policyholders, or beneficiaries-and investors in real
assets.2
Financial intermediaries may be grouped in two main classes accord-
ing to their predominant source of funds. One major class includes
commercial banks,3 savings and loan associations, 4 mutual savings
banks,' life insurance companies," fire and casualty insurance com-
I. The concept of a financial intermediary might be approached in two steps. "Finan-
cial enterprises" can be said to include "all economic units-business enterprises as well
as nonprofit and government organizations-that are primarily engaged in the holding of
and trading in intangible assets (claims and equities)." The term "financial intermedi-
aries" can then be taken to mean all financial enterprises except holding companies and
closely held (or "personal") investment or holding companies. R. GOLDSMITH, FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIES IN TIHE AMERIcAN ECONOMY SINCE 1900, at 50-51 (1958).
2. "Intermediation" is the process whereby savings are channeled to investors through
intermediaries rather than directly. The term "disintermediation" is used to describe net
outflows of funds from intermediaries or from an especially vulnerable group of them.
e.g., thrift institutions. The lost funds often flow into direct investment in financial as-
sets, e.g., treasury bills. See, e.g., Mullineaux, Interest-Rate Ceilings and the Treasury-Bill
Market: Disintermediation and the Small Saver, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., July-Aug. 1973,
at 19.
3. Commercial banks principally issue checking accounts and time and savings de-
posits. They invest funds received in business loans and government securities. Since
demand deposits with them are typically included in the definition of the money
supply, they occupy a peculiarly important role in the financial system. As of yearend
1973, their financial assets in the United States amounted to more than $713 billion.
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS: 1965-
1973, at 33 (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 FLOW OF FUNDS]. Their assets at the
time of writing approach $900 billion. Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.8 (May
13, 1975). For a general description of the major types of financial intermediaries, see
R. ROBINSON & D. WRIGHTSMAN, FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE AccuMuLATION AND ALLOCATION
OF WEALTH 44-56 (1974).
4. Savings and loan associations principally issue savings accounts and invest money
in mortgage loans secured by residential real estate. Their financial assets at yearend
1973 were $272 billion. 1974 FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 3, at 34. They may be char-
tered under federal law, 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464 (Supp.
1974), in which case they are mutual organizations (see p. 1630 infra), or under
state law, in which case they may be stock or mutual organizations. As of December
31, 1972, there were 3,495 state chartered associations representing 63 percent of the
total number and holding 44.6 percent of the total assets of the business. ABA -HAND-
BOOK OF SAVINGS AND LOAN LAW 33 (1973). Only about 659 of all savings and loan as-
sociations were capital stock organizations and their assets then totalled $50 billion
(out of $243 billion for all associations). Id. at 14.
5. Mutual savings banks, all of which are organized under state law, are similar to
savings and loan associations in their liabilities and financial assets. They are concen-
trated, however, in the New England and Atlantic states. Their investment portfolios
contain a somewhat larger proportion of debt securities other than mortgages. At yearend
1973 their financial assets were $107 billion. 1974 FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 3, at 34.
6. Life insurance companies are chartered and regulated under state law and may
be stock or mutual organizations. Their liabilities are principally to policyholders and
consist of life insurance reserves ($142 billion, at yearend 1973) and pension plan re-
serves (S57 billion); they issue little ordinary debt. 1974 FLow OF FUNDS, supra note 3,
at 35. Their total financial assets exceeded $244 billion at yearend 1973 and consisted
principally of corporate bonds and mortgages. Id. Of the 1,829 companies in business at
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panies, 7 mutual funds,8 real estate investment trusts,9 and public and
private pension funds.' 0 This class, which might be called "first order
financial intermediaries," obtains most of its capital from individual
households.'. The other class, or "second order financial intermedi-
aries," includes the Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal Home Loan
Banks, finance companies, and many other institutions, and obtains
funds directly from other financial entities, such as commercial banks,
thrift institutions, and bank holding companies, and only indirectly
from households and nonfinancial business enterprises. It is with the
tax treatment of first order financial intermediaries'12 that this article
is concerned.
The enormous long term growth of financial intermediation is one
of the most significant institutional facts about advanced economic
systems as they have developed in this century.13 The much stud-
mid-1972, more than nine-tenths were stock companies, but the remaining 153 mutual
companies, which are generally older and larger, had about two-thirds of the assets of
all United States life insurance companies and accounted for slightly over half of the
life insurance in force. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 1973,
at 91.
7. Fire and casualty insurance companies are organized and regulated under state
law and may be stock or mutual companies. They issue property and liability insurance
policies and invest principally in tax-exempt municipal securities and in corporate stock.
Total financial assets at yearend 1973 of all nonlife insurance companies exceeded $68
billion. 1974 FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 3, at 35.
8. "Mutual funds" is the popular name given to open end investment companies
(those which continuously issue shares redeemable at net asset value at the shareholder's
option). They comprise the largest class of investment companies. Investment companies
invest principally in corporate stock, though market conditions can produce other pat-
terns, e.g., funds invested in high-yield money market instruments. Though publicly
owned investment companies technically are chartered under state law, they are nor-
mally registered, and extensively regulated, under the federal Investment Company Act
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970). The total financial assets of open end invest-
ment companies at yearend 1973 exceeded $46 billion. 1974 FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note
3, at 36.
9. Real estate investment trusts, which are organized as business trusts, issue large
amounts of debt securities and debt paper in addition to shares of beneficial interest.
They invest funds principally in real estate and in mortgages secured by real estate.
Their total financial assets at yearend 1973 approached $17 billion and far exceeded
their $3 billion investments in physical assets. Id.
10. Private pension funds invest principally in corporate stocks and bonds. State and
local government employee retirement funds also invest in such securities, but the pro-
portion of their assets in corporate stock is significantly smaller. The total financial assets
at yearend 1973 of these two groups of pension funds exceeded $133 billion and 581
billion, respectively. 1974 FLOw OF FUNDS, supra note 3, at 35.
11. See R. GoLsmiT, supra note 1, at 7. There are qualifications, however; for ex-
ample, some real estate investment trusts get most of their capital in the form of bank
loans.
12. Goldsmith's distinction between primary and secondary financial intermediaries
is similar to my distinction between first and second order financial intermediaries.
See id. at 51.
13. In the United States, for example, there has been a significant growth in savings
since 1900, with the proportion of total savings attributable to households averaging
about 80 percent, as compared to 15 percent attributable to corporations and five percent
to governments. Harvard Business School Course Material No. 9-271-053 Fl173, Capital
Markets: The Determinants of Saving and Its Allocation, 1971, at 7 (Intercollegiate Case
Clearing House, Boston, distrib.). The proportion of savings invested in financial assets,
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ied 14 and vigorously debated 15 growth in the role of institutional in-
vestors in the stock markets is only one part of this movement, a part
which for its own peculiar reasons has been highly publicized. The
role of financial intermediaries in the other major capital markets, 16
such as the primary and secondary mortgage markets, the market for
United States government securities, the market for corporate debt
instruments, and the market for municipal securities, has been of equal
or greater economic consequence.' 7
The growth of financial intermediation is not accidental, nor is it
a mere manifestation of the increasing complexity of our economic
institutions. The trend has its own economic logic. Financial inter-
mediaries offer several advantages to individual suppliers of capital:
putative financial expertise, economies of scale, and the ability to di-
versify and pool investments.' 8 Intermediaries commonly advertise that
their funds are managed by professional investment analysts, who
might be thought to invest more wisely than the man in the street.
Intermediaries may realize economies of scale by allowing savers to
share the costs of security analysis, portfolio management, and market
transactions. Diversification of financial assets allows savers or inves-
tors to reduce risk with no or little impairment of the expected re-
turn from their portfolios;' 9 intermediaries are a necessary means of
such as stocks and bonds, as opposed to real assets, such as houses, has declined from
44.4 percent in 1900-1912 (as adjusted to conform to flow of funds data in 1945), to
34.2 percent in 1953-1962. However, the proportion of financial assets issued by financial
intermediaries as opposed to ultimate users of invested capital has increased dramatically
-according to one estimate, from 38 percent in the period 1900-1912 to 83 percent in
the period 1953-1963. Id.
14. See generally SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doe. No. 92-64,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
15. See, e.g., Hearings on the Impact of Institutional Investors in the Stock Market
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Markets of the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973).
16. A very rough idea of the sizes of the major capital markets might be inferred
from the 1973 yearend outstanding amounts of the corresponding types of securities:
corporate equities, $968 billion (at market value); total mortgages, $640 billion; U.S.
government securities, $422 billion; corporate and foreign bonds, $264 billion; and state
and local government securities, $190 billion. 1974 FLow OF FUNDS, supra note 3, at
40-43. These figures cannot, of course, indicate the relative amounts of outstanding
securities that are "in" each market nor the relative vigor of primary and secondary
trading in each market; the different markets do have distinct characteristics that re-
flect differences in the character of the issuers and the dominance of particular kinds
of buyers in them. See generally R. ROBINSON & D. WRiGHTSMAN, supra note 3, at 225-363.
17. See R. GoLsAinH, supra note 1, at 183 (role of intermediaries in external fi-
nancing of main sectors of the economy); R. GoLDs~ArrH, TIE FLow OF CAPrrAL FUNDS
IN THE POSTWAR ECONOMY 9 (1965) (shares of financial institutions in four of the five
major capital markets increased in the postwar period; but their share of total treasury
securities issued was not substantially changed).
18. R. ROBINSON & D. WRIGHrSMAN, supra note 3, at 41.
19. See H. MARKowrrz, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INvESrMENTS
112-15 (1959); Samuelson, General Proof that Diversification Pays (pt. II) J. FINAN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANAL., Mar. 1967, at 1. -
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achieving diversification because many individuals do not have enough
money to diversify their investments successfully by themselves.20 The
pooling of assets by intermediaries enables the individual saver, who
cannot accurately predict future contingencies affecting his need for
money, to invest in relatively liquid claims against the intermediary,
while the intermediary can reinvest those funds safely in less liquid
and longer term claims against ultimate investors. The reinvestment
can be made with safety because of the law of large numbers: what
is a dramatic contingency to the individual is a small one to the
intermediary, which is only concerned with the probabilities of over-
all net changes in the flow of funds to and from its suppliers of capital.
The pooling of assets is perhaps the basic reason for the growth of fi-
nancial intermediaries. It encourages capital formation and invest-
ment in longer term financial assets, and therefore suggests that in-
termediation has a beneficial effect on economic growth and stability.2-
Because of their importance to the economy in general and to the in-
vestment patterns of individuals in particular, financial intermedi-
aries have been a subject of serious legislative concern. 22 Perhaps the
most significant recent proposals are those of the Hunt Commission
Report,23 which were submitted in modified form to Congress as pro-
posed legislation.24 These proposals, which covered a wide variety of
related topics, focused principally on financial institutions in the nar-
row sense (commercial banks and thrift institutions). A significant
part of the proposals was the establishment of equal tax treatment
between these two types of institutions.2
This article attempts to approach the subject of the proper federal
income tax treatment of first order financial intermediaries from a
more general vantage point than did the Hunt Commission. The
20. For practical purposes, the advantages of diversifying a portfolio by buying se-
curities whose rates of return at various risk levels are negatively correlated appear
to become negligible at the point where the portfolio contains roughly 20 securities.
See K. SMITH, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 126-31 (1971); J. WILLIAMSON, INVESTMENTS: NEW
ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES 120-21 (1971); Evans & Archer, Diversification and the Reduction
of Dispersion: An Empirical Analysis, 23 J. FINAN. 761 (1968); Mao, Essentials of Port-
folio Diversification Strategy, 25 J. FINAN. 1109 (1970). It thus seems that millions of
less wealthy individuals in the United States who supply funds to financial inter-
mediaries, via small demand and savings accounts, modest insurance policies, and small-
sized mutual fund share accounts, could not directly and cheaply assemble an optimally
diversified portfolio.
21. R. ROBINSON & D. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 3, at 41-42.
22. See generally Verkuil, Perspectives on Reform of Financial Institutions, 83 YALE
L.J. 1349 (1974); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 93D CONG., 1sT
SEss., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: REFORM AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Comm. Print 1973).
23. PRESIDENT'S COs.Zt'N ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATION, REPORT (1972).
24. S.1267, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); S.2591, H.R. 10990, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
25. The tax provisions of the bills cited in the preceding note are summarized in 5
CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 96,092, at 81,167-68.
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The Federal Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries
first part of the article develops a conceptual framework for under-
standing and criticizing the present tax treatment of financial inter-
mediaries and their suppliers of capital. Its principal aim is to explore
the importance of establishing a similar tax pattern for the different
kinds of intermediaries, and then to outline the most general aspects
of that pattern. Succeeding parts of this article explain the present
tax treatment of the major types of first order financial intermediaries
and analyze that treatment in light of the ideal pattern.2 0 These parts
will also state and criticize the reasons historically given for the
major special tax provisions. The concluding section suggests some
changes in the existing law.
I. A Framework for Understanding and Evaluating the
Tax Treatment of Financial Intermediaries
Tax practitioners who specialize in giving advice to a particular
kind of financial intermediary are not likely to be experts in the
detailed tax treatment of all other intermediaries. This situation is
indicated by the complexity of the subject, and by the fact that the
law reflects real differences in the nature of the businesses conducted
by intermediaries. Although economists and financial analysts per-
ceive financial intermediation to be a coherent subject of historical
study and theoretical analysis, 27 tax policymakers have considered each
institution in a separate compartment; and treatises, articles, and hear-
ings traditionally concern insurance companies, or banks, or invest-
ment companies, but not all major intermediaries as a group.
It is therefore prudent to preface an investigation of tax policy
concerning all major first order financial intermediaries with an ex-
plicit statement of the framework of analysis. Before beginning the
analyses of specific intermediaries, I will develop a framework of five
analytical hypotheses which together support a certain view of the
proper pattern of taxation. First, all financial intermediaries perform
broadly similar economic functions. Second, this similarity of function
suggests a broadly similar tax treatment, a conclusion which is strength-
26. The explanations in the text are intended to go beyond the broadest generalities
without getting mired in detail. Available to the practitioner are useful, detailed tax
treatises concerning some kinds of intermediaries. E.g., R. DENNEY, A. RuA & R. SCHOEN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES (2d ed. 1966); FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUrIONS (M. Wakeley et al. eds. 1971). In view
of their intensely practical purpose, these books understandably omit discussion of the
broad concepts and policy arguments historically given in support of the relevant taxing
patterns.
27. See, e.g., Pyle, On the Theory of Financial Intermediation, 26 J. FINAN. 737 (1971).
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ened when one considers the effects of dissimilar tax treatment. A cor-
ollary is that the institution-specific concerns that have historically ac-
counted for the existing patterns of tax treatment are relatively un-
important when compared to the broad functional similarity among
intermediaries. Third, at least the public suppliers of capital28 to all
kinds of financial intermediaries should be viewed as similarly situated
for tax purposes, regardless of their formal characterization as credi-
tors, shareholders, policyholders, and so forth. Fourth, the arguments
for integration of the corporate and individual taxes, which are sound
generally, apply with equal or greater force in the case of financial
intermediaries, and integration of the taxes on a financial inter-
mediary and its public suppliers of capital is both a desirable and a
feasible goal. Fifth, through a series of historical accidents, 29 the
present patterns of tax treatment come close to achieving that goal,
though some significant reforms remain to be made.
A. Similarity of Economic Function
Financial intermediaries perform broadly similar economic func-
tions. They enable pooling and diversification of portfolio risk to take
place more efficiently and on a larger scale. By pooling their claims
against assets, a group of individuals can take advantage of the law
of large numbers, according to which contingencies unpredictable on
an individual basis are quite predictable for large numbers. In its
simplest application, pooling enables financial intermediaries to ac-
complish liquidity intermediation. Individuals often want to hold
liquid assets because they cannot accurately predict future contin-
gencies that will affect their need for cash, whereas users of capital,
such as corporations, often want capital left with them for long periods
of time. An intermediary often issues relatively liquid claims against
itself, that is, claims convertible to money within a short time at no
or little sacrifice of their full value, and uses the proceeds to invest
in fairly illiquid claims.30 The intermediary can safely invest in illi-
28. See p. 1617 infra.
29. By using the word "accidents," I do not imply that the present tax patterns
were not put into law consciously and in light of extensively discussed policy goals,
but only that the patterns were not consciously enacted into law in order to achieve
the particular kind of integration here espoused.
30. A more sophisticated definition of liquidity would show the considerable com-
plexity of the concept. See Pierce, Commercial Bank Liquidity, FED. RESERVE BULL., Aug.
1966; Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, 25 Rav. EcoN. STUD. 65
(1958). One of the basic problems is that although liquidity intuitively means that "quick"
sales of an asset entail a relatively low discount from the maximum expected market
price, the amount of the discount varies with the time between the decision to sell and
the actual sale and will not follow the same pattern for all assets. Thus, asset A may
1610
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quid claims, up to a point, because of the relative stability and pre-
dictability of the exercise of claims against itself that comes with
large numbers of them. Thus, the claim of even the smallest demand
deposit accountholder at a commercial bank is, at any given time,
quickly convertible into a fixed amount of currency or, indeed, usable
as money itself. Otherwise demand deposit accounts would not be as
popular as they are. Yet banks in turn do not simply make callable
loans or invest in highly liquid securities on the strength of these
assets, but make many business loans for which there is no significant
secondary market, and which have substantial periods to maturity: 30,
60, and 90 day loans and even term loans for periods longer than a year.
Similarly, thrift institutions, whose individual depositors-or, more
appropriately, "suppliers of capital" 31-hold savings deposits and time
accounts that can be converted to cash on relatively short notice, make
long term mortgage loans which are often not readily marketable.32
Mutual fund shares are perhaps the ultimate in liquidity for the small
investor who wishes to participate in the stock market, since he can
always cash in his shares quickly for their net asset value.33 Real ,es-
tate investment trusts offer investors highly liquid shares in a portfolio
of relatively illiquid realty and mortgage interests.
On the other hand, insurance companies and pension funds effect
a different kind of intermediation between the time structures of the
preferences for money of capital suppliers and capital users. In the
absence of special legislation providing for cash surrender values and
requiring that life insurance companies stand ready to make policy
loans, 34 a life insurance contract would be an illiquid investment.
Yet a principal function of insurance (and of pension plans) is to
provide money upon the happening of a predicted event or uncertain
contingency that dramatically increases the capital supplier's need for
sell at a lower discount from the maximum market value than asset B when the sale
occurs one day after the decision to sell, but asset B may sell at the lower discount
if one week is allowed for the sale. One therefore must specify a relevant time period
before ranking assets in terms of liquidity.
31. See, e.g., notes 19, 20 supra.
32. It has been suggested that the degree of liquidity intermediation of United
States thrift institutions exceeds sound limits: they borrow short and lend too long.
See, e.g., Anderson 9. Eisenmenger, Structural Reform for Thrift Institutions: The
Experience of the United States and Canada, NEw ENG. ECON. REv. July-Aug. 1972, at 3.
3i3. It is probably true that if (a) there were active, broad, and highly efficient
secondary markets in all equity securities and (b) all investors were wealthy enough to
be able economically to assemble their own diversified portfolios of such securities,
there would be no need for financial intermediaries like mutual funds. Under such
circumstances, the stock market would serve the need for intermediation perfectly; but
these conditions are not fully satisfied in reality.
34. Most states have such legislation. See D. McGILL, LiFE INSURANCE 295 (1959);
Richardson, Nonforfeiture Values and Policy Loans, in D. GRE G, LIFE AND HEALTH IN-
SURANCE HANDBOOK 153, 156, 160 (1964).
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money. Even if the policy were illiquid in general, it would become
quickly convertible to cash without penalty at precisely the time
when cash is needed to make up for a sudden though previously spe-
cified loss. A capital supplier who wanted to provide for beneficiaries
in the event of his death by investing in a financial asset such as a
long term commercial mortgage, and who had funds to invest in
only one or two such assets, would be foolish to do so directly, even
though his life expectancy might exactly equal the term of the mort-
gage loan. If he should die at a time other than the projected one,
the need to convert the loan quickly into cash might entail a consider-
able sacrifice. Similar remarks can be made about fire and casualty
insurance and about pension rights.
The other significant common economic function of financial in-
termediaries, their ability to provide diversification for public sup-
pliers of capital, has been thoroughly discussed in the literature.35
It may be argued that financial intermediaries are not needed to pro-
vide pooling and investment diversification, because these functions
can be served by the operation of ordinary corporations and the capi-
tal markets. As for pooling, if one looks only at the stock markets
and the market for United States government securities, it might be
thought that highly liquid assets are readily available for the buying
without the help of intermediaries. This is true, of course, but the
situation is not so fortunate in the markets for municipal securities
and mortgage loans. As for investment diversification, it might be
thought that corporations themselves could provide all of it that is
needed; conglomerate mergers are routinely justified on the ground
that they reduce risk to the shareholders. Why not allow conglomerates
freely to diversify, so that even the smallest investor who can effi-
ciently buy shares in only one public company can have the opportuni-
ty to buy shares in a widely diversified pool of business activities?
Apart from serious doubts about the ability of managements to op-
erate effectively conglomerate business empires, the answer is that
diversification by this method will realize only a small portion of the
possibilities for combining interests in different business activities.
If claims against business entities are evidenced in readily transferable
pieces of paper, or in their counterparts in the form of computer
entries, it is a technically simple matter to achieve diversification by
adjusting the pieces of paper or the computer entries, and it is far
easier in this way to obtain a combined interest in almost any con-
35. See notes 19, 20 supra.
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ceivable set of business activities. The conglomeration of business
activities by merger is in this sense a clumsy way of achieving the
same end as putting together a diversified portfolio of securities. 36
B. The Case for Similarity of Tax Treatment
The broadly similar economic functions served by financial inter-
mediaries suggest that they be taxed similarly under the federal in-
come tax law. To assess the validity of this hypothesis, it is helpful
to ponder the consequences of unequal tax treatment. The present
system taxes financial intermediaries with different degrees of severity.
Commercial banks and fire and casualty companies are most heavily
taxed, and among the latter group mutual companies are favored. Life
insurance companies and thrift institutions are treated more leniently.
Mutual funds and real estate investment trusts are taxed, if at all,
on small portions of their income. Qualified pension plans escape
taxation.
These differences in tax treatment have at least two major conse-
quences: they influence the extent to which different types of finan-
cial intermediaries invest in tax-exempt municipal securities, and they
influence the relative rates of growth of different types of financial
intermediaries.
Some immediate effects of differential tax treatment on investment
in municipal securities are obvious from an inspection of investment
portfolios. Commercial banks and stock fire and casualty companies
operate under a strict tax regime, and as one might predict, they do
in fact invest heavily in tax-exempt municipal securities.37 Qualified
private pension plans, by contrast, invest almost nothing in municipal
securities. 38 The precise impact of the tax laws is not so easy to measure
in the case of the other institutions, since the portfolio composition
36. See Levy & Sarnat, Diversification, Portfolio Analysis and the Uneasy Case for
Conglomerate Mergers, 25 J. FINAN. 795 (1970) (value cannot be created in perfect capital
markets by diversifying mergers of firms, since individual stockholders could "self-di-
versify"); Smith 9- Schreiner, A Portfolio Analysis of Conglomerate Diversification, 24
J. FINAN. 416, 425 (1969) (acquiring firm, unlike diversifying individual, must ordinarily
make a "lumpy" investment). The remarks in the text pertain to the achievement of
investment diversification via merger; I am not here implying anything about the validity
of other reasons for conglomerate mergers.
37. Of the $713 billion of financial assets held by commercial banks at yearend
1973, there were about $95 billion worth of state and local government obligations. If
there were any sizable holdings of municipal securities by private pension funds, they
are buried in the small "miscellaneous assets" category (less than four percent of total
financial assets) used in flow of funds data. 1974 FLow OF FUNDS, supra note 3, at 33, 35.
Moreover, in 1973, commercial banks accounted for more than 40 percent of the net
increase in outstanding state and local obligations (and even higher proportions in earlier
years), while the role of pension funds was insignificant. Id. at 17.
38. Id.
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of a financial intermediary is a function of at least two major factors
in addition to the tax laws: legal regulations restricting kinds of in-
vestments that particular types of institutions may make (which, for
example, explains why banks do not trade in the stock market in
their own right, but only as trustees); and the liquidity problems
faced by particular kinds of intermediaries (which, for example, ex-
plain why life insurance companies invest so heavily in privately
placed long term corporate notes and in long term mortgage loans).
However, an important policy point can be extracted despite this
causal uncertainty. Assuming that the growth of financial interme-
diation as a whole, and the relative growth of different types of fi-
nancial intermediaries, are only partly determined by taxing patterns,
whether there will be large amounts invested in municipal securities
depends on the fortuity that relatively larger pools of capital will be
in the hands of those particular types of financial intermediaries which
operate under a relatively strict tax regime. If the relative amounts
of assets managed by banks and life insurance companies were to
remain the same,39 but the severity of their tax treatment reversed,
the demand for municipal securities would, ceteris paribus, drop and
the amount of municipal securities purchased fall. Even assuming
some rationality behind the tax-exempt treatment of municipal se-
curities, I can think of no persuasive reason for letting the amount
of the federal tax subsidy to municipal enterprises vary with the
relative sizes of asset pools managed by institutional investors with
different effective tax rates. A rational relationship between the need
to aid local government and the growth of commercial banks is dif-
ficult to ascertain. 40
A program of equalization of tax burdens on financial intermedi-
aries might result in a decrease or an increase in the amount of
municipal debt issued.41 The point is simply that greater similarity
of tax treatment would eliminate or reduce the influence of one ma-
jor irrelevant variable-namely, differences in the growth rates of dif-
ferent types of financial intermediaries-on the quantity of municipal
39. Banks control financial assets worth about three times as much as those of life
insurance companies. See notes 3, 6 supra.
40. In a sense, of course, this observation is but a part of a larger anomaly: the amount
of the federal tax subsidy to local government varies with the amount of wealth con-
trolled by high bracket taxpayers. To point this out is not, however, to detract from the
seriousness of the results caused by tax patterns affecting intermediaries, because the
institutional investors are more and more becoming the investors whose tax rates matter.
41. Whether a program of equalization of the tax treatment of financial intermediaries
would increase or decrease the purchase of municipal securities would depend on the
actual shapes of the relevant supply and demand curves and their relation to one another
before and after implementation of the program.
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securities purchased, and would tend to make the demand for munic-
ipal securities more stable. This result should make it easier to regu-
late the level of investment in municipal securities.
The second major effect of differential tax treatment, the effect
on rates of growth of financial intermediaries, is most evident in the
case of real estate investment trusts, which are veritable creatures of
the tax law.42 Similarly, the growth of pension plans clearly reflects
the influence of tax considerations. Special tax benefits may encourage
the flow to one intermediary of capital that would not have otherwise
gone to any intermediary, as well as capital that would otherwise have
gone to a different type of intermediary-for example, to an insurance
company selling individual annuities instead of a qualified pension
plan administered by a commercial bank.
Whether the effect of the tax laws on the relative growth of finan-
cial intermediaries is good or bad depends on a number of factors.
One might start with a presumption against tax rules which affect
the allocation of resources among institutions broadly similar in eco-
nomic function. Absent a countervailing social policy as to which there
is a clear political consensus, the tax law should not interfere with
market choices of what sorts of financial intermediation should be
provided in what amounts.
The only disparity in tax treatment of financial intermediaries
which is clearly justified under this principle is the tax exemption
for qualified pension plans. There has been a deliberate and fully
conscious congressional determination, supported by large segments of
society, that the exemption is necessary to induce a socially desirable
level of saving for retirement. The Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 197443 is a strong reaffirmation of this policy. Curiously,
there is no comparable consensus about a supposed national need
to favor via the tax law the purchase of life insurance, on the pa-
ternalistic ground that people will, due to darkly irrational psycho-
logical causes, inevitably not buy enough of it without tax assistance.
The present tax treatment of life insurance companies seems more
the result of effective lobbying expressed partly in the guise of eso-
teric and confusing conceptual arguments about the nature of income.
The same can be said about the arcane devices, such as special bad
debt reserve computations and protection against loss accounts, 44 en-
42. See Schulkin, Real Estate Investment Trusts: A New Financial Intermediary, NEw
ENG. EcoN. RFv., Nov.-Dec. 1970, at 1.
43. Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2, 88 Stat. 829 (findings and declaration of policy) recites
that employee benefit plans are "affected with a national public interest."
44. See pp. 1633-35, 1669-71 infra.
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acted to aid thrift institutions and mutual fire and casualty companies.
These devices do not rest upon a political consensus about public
welfare sufficient to overcome the rule against tax-induced misalloca-
tions of resources. Furthermore, the commitment to housing as a na-
tional priority is a weak argument to justify peculiarities in the way
that real estate investment trust and thrift institutions are taxed. I
wonder, for example, why real estate investment trusts, real estate
limited partnerships, commercial banks, and thrift institutions are
all taxed differently from one another with respect to their income
from mortgage loans. The policy to aid housing does not argue for
differential treatment of institutions that invest in mortgage loans.
I suggest that financial intermediaries (except pension funds) should
be taxed similarly because they perform broadly similar economic func-
tions. Specifically, I propose a particular form of tax neutrality prin-
ciple: absent a clear political consensus about overriding policy goals,
the tax law should not influence differentially the portfolio compo-
sition of the different kinds of intermediaries, and it should not affect
differentially the flow of funds into the different kinds of inter-
mediaries.
C. Similarity at the Individual Level: The Concept of
Public Suppliers of Capital
If financial intermediaries are considered for tax purposes as a co-
herent group of fundamentally similar entities, concomitant attention
must be paid to the individuals who supply capital to these inter-
mediaries. One of the most fundamental questions concerning the
tax treatment of the intermediaries is whether it should be integrated
with the tax treatment of some or all their suppliers of capital. Before
taking up this question, I will distinguish among different classes of
capital suppliers, and then consider separately the importance and
political feasibility of integration with respect to each class. One way
of doing this might be to divide capital suppliers into various groups
-creditors, shareholders, policyholders-simply in terms of their legal
status. This approach would achieve clarity and definiteness at low
cost but is arbitrary and formalistic. Another approach would be to
cut across these categories and divide the capital suppliers in terms
of economic classes, such as wealthy investors and small investors. This
approach would have greater usefulness for a policy-oriented analysis
but might be enormously difficult of practical application. Rather, I
think that the proper categories for use in comparing the tax treatment
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of individuals supplying capital to intermediaries are to be defined in
mixed yet politically intelligible terms. What I term "public suppliers
of capital" to a given financial intermediary are those belonging to
a legally distinct class comprised of members who are numerous, of
relatively modest means on the average, and who typically supply
the greatest bulk of capital to the particular kind of financial insti-
tution. What for lack of a better label I will call "elite suppliers of
capital" are less numerous and typically wealthier. They generally
supply a smaller proportion of capital to any given type of financial
intermediary than do the public suppliers.
These descriptions are necessarily but not uselessly vague; an ex-
ample may help to understand them. The investors who correspond,
in the case of a commercial bank, to the class of shareholders in a
mutual fund are not the shareholders of the commercial bank but
its depositors, even though the depositors are technically creditors.
The depositors may have contributed 11 times as much as did its
stockholders; 4u the mutual fund shareholders will have contributed at
least two-thirds of the assets of the mutual fund, with any other
capital coming from a bank.46 Bank depositors, and to a lesser extent,
mutual fund shareholders, are extremely numerous and often of mod-
est means. By contrast, bank shares are often closely held, or if not,
they are predominantly owned by shareholders in the highest income
classes, as in the case of holdings of corporate equity securities gen-
erally.4 7 By an extension of the analysis, public suppliers of capital
include depositors at banks, savings and loan associations, and mu-
tual savings banks; shareholders in mutual funds and real estate
investment trusts; and individual policyholders in all types of insur-
ance companies. Elite suppliers of capital include bank shareholders,
shareholders in stock savings and loan associations, and shareholders
in stock life insurance companies and stock fire and casualty insurance
companies.
Public suppliers of capital might also be designated "small savers"
45. As of April 30, 1975, gross demand and time deposits of all U.S. commercial
banks were estimated at about $716.9 billion, while total capital accounts of the banks
were estimated at about $64.7 billion. Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.8 (May 14,
1975).
46. Registered open end investment companies cannot issue senior securities but
may borrow from banks, provided there is (and remains) an asset coverage of at least
300 percent for all loans. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 18(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)
(1970). Mutual funds apparently keep well below this limit, for statistical compilations
typically omit their liabilities, e.g., 1974 FLOW OF FuNDs, supra note 3, at 86, or assume
that they are zero, e.g., STAFF OF HOUSE Coasa. ON BANKING AND CURnrNCy, supra note
22, at 85.
47. Blume, Crockett & Friend, Stockownership in the United States: Characteristics
and Trends, SURvEy OF CURRENT Bus., Nov. 1974, at 16.
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or "small investors," both of which are more common terms. I doubt
that these terms are adequate to cover all the relevant cases. It sounds
odd, for example, to describe a depositor in a bank as an "investor."
It also sounds odd to call a purchaser of a home protection or auto-
mobile insurance policy from a property and casualty insurance com-
pany a "saver" or an "investor." Although some portion of his pre-
mium payments might be traced into investments in financial assets
by the insurance company-that is, the policyholder has supplied capi-
tal to the intermediary and made intermediation possible-the policy-
holder may think of himself as buying a service, insurance protection,
rather than as saving or investing money.48
D. The Case for Integrated Tax Treatment
The next hypothesis is that the arguments for integration of the
corporate and personal taxes are sound generally and apply with equal
or greater force in the case of financial intermediaries. The arguments
for full integration have been exhaustively developed (and recently
summarized in an excellent article).49 Only the essentials need be dis-
cussed here. If the progressive rate structure made applicable to indi-
vidual taxpayers 0 is taken as a norm, then the corporate tax intro-
duces severe deviations from that norm. If corporate income is dis-
tributed to individual shareholders, it is taxed twice or, more pre-
cisely, about one and a half times. The net income is taxed once at
the flat corporate rate and then the after-corporate-tax income is taxed
at the progressive rates applicable to individual shareholders receiving
dividends. Compared with equal income from other sources, 51 cor-
porate source income is overtaxed, in what might be called a "vertical
inequity." Again, comparing two taxpayers with equal incomes, only
one of which is from a corporate source, the difference in tax treat-
ment might be called a "horizontal inequity." Of course, if the mar-
kets for income-producing assets fully capitalize after-tax rates of re-
turn, the effect of differences caused by the corporate tax may be
greatly reduced after an initial period of adjustment. For example,
investors in a certain tax bracket may get the same after-tax return
from a tax-free municipal bond as they would get from a taxable
48. See pp. 1637-38, 1658-59 infra.
49. McClure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing
Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REv. 532 (1975).
50. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1 [hereinafter cited by section only].
51. Cf. B. BITrER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 1-9 (3d ed. 1971) (table comparing taxation of a proprietorship with that
?f a corporation and its sole shareholder, on the assumption that all corporate income
is distributed).
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bond presenting a comparable risk; only taxpayers in a still higher
bracket (if any) will be able to obtain preferential treatment by pur-
chasing the tax-exempt bond. On the other hand, even assuming that
tax differentials were fully reflected in the prices of capital assets,
such differentials would still induce' a misallocation of resources-
for example, by shifting resources from the corporate sector into other
sectors .
52
When judged by the norm of the progressive rate scheme, corporate-
source income may be undertaxed as well as overtaxed. If corporate
income is not currently distributed but reinvested in the business,
it is currently taxed only once, at the flat corporate rate, which may
be much lower than the marginal tax bracket of wealthy shareholders.
If the wealthy shareholder later realizes the increment in value of his
investment attributable to the after-corporate-tax addition to retained
earnings, as by selling his stock, he then pays only a capital gain tax.
The corporate-level tax plus the deferred capital gain tax together may
still amount to a lesser tax burden than would a current single tax
on corporate-source income at the shareholder's personal rate.53 Large,
public, growth-oriented companies may adopt low dividend payout
ratios and, because of the undertax possibilities, attract the investment
dollars of high bracket taxpayers. Conversely, more mature companies
may adopt high dividend payout ratios to attract the investment dol-
lars of lower bracket taxpayers. In fact, there is evidence that com-
panies and investors match themselves in this way.54
Conceptually, the simplest resolution of the problems of vertical
and horizontal inequities and of the misallocation of resources is to
treat all corporations like partnerships (and shareholders like partners),
that is, not to tax the entity as such but instead to consider all of its
income as income of the partners, whether currently distributed to
them or not, and to tax the income at the partners' rates. This solu-
tion is thought to be administratively unfeasible; a mixed system ap-
proaching the same goal, detailed and justified in the Canadian Carter
Commission Report, 55 now commands the respect of important tax
theorists.50 The system, which combines the partnership model with
52. See McClure, supra note 49, at 548.
53. Cf. B. BrrrEER & J. EusncE, supra note 51, at 1-11 (table comparing taxation
of a proprietorship with that of a corporation and its sole shareholder, on the assumption
that all corporate income is accumulated and the stock is sold in 10th year).
54. Blume, Crockett & Friend, supra note 47, at 28-29.
55. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION (1966) (Canada).
56. See, e.g., Break, Integrating Corporate and Personal Income Taxes: The Carter
Commission Proposals, 34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 726 (1969); McClure, supra note 49,
at 558-61, 569-74.
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a withholding system, distinguishes among distributed income, undis-
tributed income that is allocated (at the company's option) to share-
holders, and undistributed and unallocated income. The distributed
and the allocated income are ultimately taxed only to the shareholders,
at their personal rates. However, the corporation is taxed on such in-
come at a flat rate (the highest applicable to individuals). Each share-
holder is deemed to have received his pro rata portion of the allocated
income, and is taxed on this amount as well as on the income actually
distributed to him. Nevertheless, he is also deemed to have paid his
pro rata. share of the tax actually paid by the corporation on distri-
buted and allocated income. He uses the tax deemed paid as a credit
(with the result that in many cases he receives a refund). The basis
of his shares is adjusted upwards to reflect his share of the post-tax
allocated income, in order to prevent double taxation of this economic
gain when he later sells his shares. Undistributed and unallocated
income is simply taxed to the corporation.
The case for integration, which is persuasive for virtually all busi-
ness enterprises, is even stronger for those intermediaries, such as in-
vestment companies and stock fire and casualty companies, which
invest heavily in corporate stocks and whose suppliers of capital in-
clude shareholders. The overtax aspect of the corporate tax is com-
pounded when corporations are formed which own shares in other
corporations. Consider shareholder A in corporation X which owns
shares in corporation Y (which is not, however, a subsidiary of X);
X and Y both distribute all their current income to their shareholders.
Income passing from X through Y to A is taxed at three levels. To
be sure, if Y is a domestic (United States) corporation, X may claim
an 85 percent dividend received deduction 57 and pay a tax of less than
7.5 percent on the dividend income. The additional layer of tax, there-
fore, is not as large in percentage terms as the others. This does not,
of course, mean that its economic effects are insignificant.
Except in special cases,58 corporations investing in other corporations
can ordinarily claim only the 85 percent dividend received deduction,
rather than a 100 percent deduction, apparently because of a Depres-
sion era hostility to complex holding company systems.59 The survival
of the limited deduction is, however, unfortunate. Its effects are felt
principally by financial intermediaries like stock fire and casualty
companies which invest substantial amounts of money in stocks, but
57. § 243(a)(1).
58. § 243(a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(1).
59. See B. Brrrnma & J. Eusnmc, supra note 51, at 5-18.
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which, unlike mutual funds, are not given special tax treatment. What-
ever the propriety of allowing ordinary industrial corporations to re-
ceive a 100 percent dividend received deduction, there is no justifi-
cation for denying it to stock fire and casualty companies with respect
to ordinary stock investments in their portfolios. Their purpose In
assembling a portfolio of stocks is certainly not tainted with a sup-
posedly unsavory desire to erect a complicated holding company
structure.
In sum, the integration of the corporate and individual taxes is
considered socially desirable in order to prevent misallocation of re-
sources and to remove horizontal and vertical inequities caused by
the two-tax system. These arguments are generally applicable to fi-
nancial intermediaries, and are particularly strong as applied to some
of them. The next questions are whether any degree of integration
has been achieved in the case of financial intermediaries, and to what
extent further integration would be a politically feasible goal.
E. General Remarks about the Present Tax Treatment
The examination below of the present tax treatment of interme-
diaries reveals that in an important sense the Code comes close, through
a series of historical accidents, to achieving the goal of full integration,
though some significant reforms remain to be made. Specifically, a
rough kind of integration has been achieved in a number of cases
between the corporate tax on the intermediary and the personal tax
on its public suppliers of capital.
There is no movement toward integration, however, in the area of
income earned by financial intermediaries and allocable to their elite
suppliers of capital (the stockholders of commercial banks, stock sav-
ings and loan associations, stock life insurance companies, and stock
fire and casualty companies). These shareholders are taxed like ordi-
nary corporation shareholders, whose socioeconomic attributes are
probably more similar to those of elite suppliers of capital than to
those of public suppliers of capital.60 Thus, the case for integration
of elite suppliers' income taxes is not as compelling as that for taxes
of public suppliers. This is not to say that stockholders in different
types of stock financial intermediaries are all taxed alike; this article
will show that different financial intermediaries operate under dif-
ferent tax systems, and these differences inevitably affect the tax bur-
den on the residual owners of the enterprise. But the tax burdens on
60. See generally Blume, Crockett 9: Friend, supra note 47.
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elite suppliers of capital generally pose the same problems that have
been discussed in the context of proposals to achieve full integration
with respect to all corporations: if they (the elite suppliers of capital)
are in relatively low tax brackets the intermediary-level tax means
fhat they are overtaxed; if they are in very high tax brackets, they may
very well be undertaxed. It does not appear realistic to hope that these
problems can be solved before Congress makes up its mind, if it ever
does, to adopt a technique of full integration for all business entities.
By contrast, integration of intermediary taxes and taxes on public sup-
pliers of capital does appear politically feasible; present law approaches
that objective, and some improvements to complete the picture may
realistically be suggested.
Assuming that full integration of the corporate level and personal
level taxes is desirable, it does not follow as a matter of strict logic
that a lesser degree of integration, as between financial intermediaries
and their public suppliers of capital, is better than the existing pat-
tern. Several general considerations, however, do suggest that an im-
provement might result from such a move. As for the problem of
integrating with respect to financial intermediaries but not all other
business corporations, one can argue that financial enterprises, by vir-
tue of their similar economic functions, form a distinct and coherent
segment of the economy. Even if integration with respect to them
causes some resources to flow from the corporate sector into them,
these resources would in turn be channeled into nonfinancial enter-
prises. And, as for the problem of integrating only with respect to
intermediaries' public suppliers of capital, the public suppliers of
capital furnish the bulk of capital to financial intermediaries.oi In-
tegrating public suppliers' taxes with those of the intermediaries to
which they supply capital should therefore produce many of the bene-
fits of full integration-especially if the remaining entity-level taxes
(on income allocable to elite suppliers of capital) are imposed equally
on different kinds of intermediaries.
We turn finally to the present tax patterns. They are presented in
light of the model of restrained and hopefully feasible integration just
proposed. For each type of intermediary, the analysis examines the
tax treatment of it and its public suppliers of capital, the justifications
61. At the end of 1971, financial intermediaries as a group had liabilities estimated
at $1,400 billion and a net worth of $100 billion. R. ROBINSON & D. WRIGHTSmAN, supra
note 3, at 229. Only a very small portion of the liabilities could be owed to elite sup-
pliers of capital, and a substantial part of the net worth-approaching $50 billion-
must be allocated to mutual fund and REIT shareholders, who may be classified as
public suppliers of capital.
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historically given for special tax provisions, and the deviations from
the model of integration. In addition, parallels are drawn between
the tax treatment of the different kinds of intermediaries.
II. Investment Companies and REIT's: Fortuitously
Integrated Treatment
A. Introduction
Regulated investment companies issue their shares publicly to in-
vestors and invest the money they receive in a diversified portfolio
of securities, with particular emphasis upon common stock. 62 The
most prominent class of investment companies are the open end in-
vestment companies, or "mutual funds." Mutual funds continuously
offer shares to the public. These shares are not generally bought and
sold on a secondary market but are instead redeemable at any time
by a shareholder for an amount equal to their net asset value at the
time of redemption. 3 Real estate investment trusts, or REIT's, are
similar investment vehicles which invest in real estate interests.
Many tend to concentrate on relatively risky mortgage loans which
commercial banks and thrift institutions avoid either because of regu-
latory constraints or as a matter of traditional practice. Some very
large REIT's, for example, specialize in short term construction and
development loans, leaving permanent financing of projects to other
lenders. 4 Investment companies and REIT's together own far smaller
amounts of financial assets than do banks, thrift institutions, and in-
surance companies. 65 Investment companies, but not REIT's, are gov-
erned by a highly articulated federal regulatory statute, the Investment
Company Act of 1940.60
The quite similar federal income tax treatment of these two types
of intermediaries is one of the happier stories in the history of the
Internal Revenue Code. The special tax treatment of mutual funds
represents a deliberate legislative effort to encourage a desirable social
objective, which effort has apparently succeeded. The law was drafted
with reasonable clarity and simplicity, given the nature of the industry,
62. See note 8 supra.
63. Cf. Investment Company Act of 1940, §§ 2(a)(32), 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(32), -5(a)(1) (1970) (definitions of "open-end company" and "redeemable security").
64. See Schulkin, Recent Developments in the REIT Industry, Nav ENG. ECON. REV.
Sept.-Oct. 1972, at 3, 6-9.
65. See notes 3-9 supra.
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970).
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and has produced little litigation in the nearly four decades since the
basic pattern was first enacted into law.
B. Present Tax Treatment
The special tax treatment of regulated investment companies, now
embodied in Part I of Subchapter M of the Code, is designed to give
investors of moderate means some of the investment advantages avail-
able to wealthy individuals. By assembling a diversified portfolio of
common stock, a wealthy investor can reduce the overall risk of his
investment. The corporations in which he invests pay tax on their
earnings, and he himself pays an additional tax on that portion of
the earnings which is distributed as dividends to him. A small investor
might lack the funds to diversify his portfolio efficiently, and if he
tried to obtain the benefits of diversification by purchasing shares in
an investment company, then, absent some special provision, he would
be burdened by a third layer of tax. Subchapter M is designed to
eliminate this third layer.
The particular tax treatment specified in Subchapter M, as well as
its anomalies, can be best understood by considering its history. The
first relevant statute, the Revenue Act of 1936, made the undistributed
profits tax the only tax applicable to a "mutual investment company"
which was publicly owned, had a diversified investment portfolio and
distributed at least 90 percent of its "net income" to shareholders-
who in turn would be taxed on whatever amounts were distributed. 7
The 90 percent requirement is, of course, a response to the problem
of undistributed profits, the consideration of which pervades the 1936
Act. If an investment company were free to determine within very
wide limits how much income to distribute, tax avoidance and frus-
tration of the progressive rate structure of the personal income tax
would be easy. If the company determined in any year that the great
majority of its shareholders would be taxed at marginal tax brackets
lower than the corporate tax rate, it would distribute all of its cur-
rent income. Under the conduit treatment provided for this kind of
financial intermediary, only the shareholders would be taxed, and at
67. Revenue Act of 1936, §§ 13(a)(3), 14, 27, 48(e)(1)(D), 49 Stat. 1652. Besides having
to meet the current-distribution-of-income requirement in order to warrant the special
tax treatment, an investment company today must meet a number of requirements re-
lated to the fundamental purpose of Subchapter M. The company must be registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Company Act of
1940; it must be publicly owned; it must have a diversified group of investments; and
at least 90 percent of its gross income must be derived from dividends, interest, and
gains from the sales of securities. See § 851(a), (b)(2), (4).
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their lower personal rates. If, however, the company knew its share-
holders to be in substantially higher brackets than the corporate tax
rate, it would retain its income, thereby paying only the lower cor-
porate tax. The shareholders would realize the benefit of the income
when they sold their stock at the cost of a deferred capital gain tax.
If death intervened to give a stepped-up basis for the stock, 68 there
would be no further tax on appreciation due to previous undistributed
income. In a sense, then, the requirement that 90 percent of net in-
come be currently distributed complements the personal holding com-
pany tax provisions,6 9 an essential purpose of which was to prevent
wealthy, high-bracket taxpayers from reducing the income tax liability
on their investment portfolios by incorporating their investments, pay-
ing a comparatively lower corporate tax on the earnings from the in-
vestments, and simply refusing to declare dividends. The personal
holding company tax itself applies only to companies with a few
shareholders.70 The 90 percent requirement therefore might be viewed
as a means of nipping in the bud the bold idea of taking the "incor-
porated pocketbook" strategy public.71
The Revenue Act of 1942 extended this conduit treatment to closed
end72 as well as open end investment companies. In addition, it modi-
fied the 90 percent current distribution requirement by requiring only
the distribution of 90 percent of the company's ordinary net income,
exclusive of capital gains.73 In a complementary provision, the Act
provided that dividends paid out of capital gains were to retain their
capital gains character in the hands of shareholders. Since 1942, there-
fore, "capital gain dividends" have been taxable to mutual fund share-
68. § 1014.
69. §§ 541-47.
70. §§ 542(a)(2) (requirement that 50 percent in value of stock be owned by or for
not more than five individuals), 544 (relevant attribution rules).
71. At the present time, an investment company formed by very wealthy investors
might fall between the Scylla of the personal holding company provisions by virtue of
having more than five unrelated shareholders, and the Charbydis of Subchapter M by
virtue of failing to qualify as a regulated investment company, e.g., by being non-
registrable under the Investment Company Act of 1940 for some reason, in which case
it would be taxed like a normal corporation. This does not mean that the shareholders,
if in high tax brackets, could attempt the retained earnings gambit with complete
safety, for they might run aground on the accumulated earnings tax provisions, §§ 531-
37, which impose a penalty tax on a corporation's unreasonable accumulation of earn-
ings. These provisions specify that a corporation's status as a "mere holding or invest-
ment company shall be prima facie evidence" of the unwholesome tax avoidance pur-
pose which triggers the tax. § 533(b).
72. Closed end investment companies are defined in the Investment Company Act
of 1940 as management investment companies other than open end companies. 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-5(a)(2) (1970). They issue securities as do ordinary public corporations-periodically,
not continuously-and do not stand ready at all times to redeem them.
73. Revenue Act of 1942, § 170, 56 Stat. 798.
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holders as capital gains.7 4 The purpose of modifying the 90 percent
requirement was to ease the burdens that would be placed on closed
end funds by mandatory capital gain dividend distributions. The net
capital gain or loss of closed end funds fluctuates greatly from year
to year. If in years when there were net capital gains, a closed end
fund were required to flush out those gains to the shareholders, its
assets would shrink toward nothing over a period of years.7 5 (Open
end funds do not face this problem, because they can replenish them-
selves by continually offering new shares to the public.) In accepting
this modification, Congress presumably recognized that it would be
difficult for investment companies to abuse their special conduit
treatment by deliberately retaining capital gains in the corporate solu-
tion. If anything, the capital gains tax rate of moderate investors (the
bulk of mutual fund investors), will be lower than the company's
rate of tax on capital gains.7 6 There is no incentive, then, to accumu-
late capital gains in an investment company for tax-avoidance reasons.
The final stone in the mosaic was inserted in 1956, when a provision
was added permitting regulated investment companies to retain their
net long term capital gains with almost the same effect for both com-
pany and shareholder as if the gain had been currently distributed as
capital gain dividends and reinvested in the company by the share-
holder. As indicated above, distributed capital gains are taxed to the
shareholder but not to the investment company. Under the new pro-
vision, § 852(b)(3)(D), if the company retains its net long term capital
gains, it pays tax at the corporate rate for such gains (30 percent, for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1974). 77 Each shareholder
is deemed to have received a constructive capital gain dividend in
the amount of his pro rata portion of the undistributed net long term
capital gain. He is also deemed to have paid a pro rata portion of
the capital gain tax actually paid by the corporation. The ordinary
small investor having little or no preference income, is taxed on net
long term capital gains at a rate of 25 percent or less. The capital
gain tax due from such a shareholder because of the constructive
74. Id.
75. See Hearings on Revision of Revenue Laws Before the House Comm. on W1ays
and Means, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 838, 844-48 (1938) (discussion of proposal like that en-
acted in 1942); cf. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 121-23 (1942); S. REP. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess, 158-60 (1942); H.R. REP. No. 2586, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 55
(Conf. Rep. 1942); Cohen, Regulated Investment Companies-Tax Treatment, in 3 HOUSE
COMM!. ON WAYS AND IEANS, TAX REvISION COMPENDIUM: COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON
BROADENING THE TAX BASE 1653, 1655-56 (Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as Tmx
REVISION COMPENDIUM].
76. Compare § 1201(a) with § 1201(b).
77. § 1201(a)(2).
1626
Vol. 84: 1603, 1975
The Federal Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries
capital gain dividend he has received will therefore be less than the
amount already paid by the company, and he will therefore obtain
a refund. If the shareholder's capital gain tax rate is higher than that
of the company, he will receive a credit for the amount of the tax he
is deemed to have paid. In addition, the aggregate basis of his shares
in the investment company will be increased by 70 percent of the
constructive capital gain dividend to him-an amount which corres-
ponds to the net amount of appreciation in the value of his investment
which has been realized and taxed.
The net effect of the treatment of undistributed capital gains is to
integrate fully corporate and personal taxes by the method advocated
in the Canadian Carter Commission Report. For reasons of adminis-
trative convenience the corporation actually pays the bulk of the tax;
since the individual tax rate ultimately controls, however, the gains
are in effect taxed almost as if they had actually been distributed and
then reinvested.73
Notice, then, the ultimate pattern. Distributed ordinary income is
taxed only to the shareholders, at their rates of tax. Undistributed
ordinary income is taxed only to the corporation, at its rate of tax.
Distributed capital gains are taxed only to shareholders, at their rates,
but so, in effect, are undistributed capital gains.
While special tax treatment for REIT's is more recent,79 the pat-
tern of the tax provisions governing them is almost identical to that
of regulated investment companies. For REIT's, as for investment com-
panies, there is a policy of allowing small investors to participate in
a diversified investment program-in this case, in mortgages and other
interests in real estate-without an additional layer of tax. 0 Indeed,
Part II of Subchapter M, which deals with REIT's, apes Part I, which
78. Cohen, supra note 75, at 1656. The equivalence is not exact, however, since an
actual capital gain dividend followed by reinvestment of the after-tax proceeds in addi-
tional shares (which reinvestment, if all shareholders participated, would leave them all
holding the same proportionate interests in the company) would often result in the
shareholder's obtaining a somewhat different increase in the aggregate basis of his in-
vestment company shares. For example, if the capital gain dividend were $100 and his
rate of tax on net long term capital gains were 25 percent, he would buy additional
shares having a cost basis of $75, whereas under § 852(b)(3)(D)(iii) the basis of his
shares would be increased by only $70. This apparent anomaly may be the result of a
simple failure to follow completely through on the desire to equate the tax treatment of
an undistributed capital gain dividend with that of a distributed capital gain dividend
followed by a reinvestment, or it may reflect the more particular decision that the in-
crease in the shareholder's basis should only reflect the actual after-tax increase in the
value of his shares which is due to realized and taxed capital gains.
79. The present provisions, in Part II of Subchapter M, were basically added by
Pub. L. No. 86-779, § 10(a), 74 Stat. 998 (1960).
80. See Kilpatrick, Real Estate Investment Trusts, in 3 TAX RvsION COMPENDIUM,
supra note 75, at 1697, 1698-1701 (1958) (discussion of prior tax treatment and argument
that LEIT's should be treated like mutual funds).
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deals with regulated investment companies. In addition, the favorable
tax treatment for REIT's has been justified as a response to the par-
ticular needs of the real estate industry."'
The threshold requirements for qualification as a REIT are dif-
ferent from the requirements for qualification as a regulated invest-
ment company. The REIT requirements are designed to ensure that
a sufficient portion of the entity's income is indeed from real estate
and mortgage loan investments.8 2 Again the requirement of 90 per-
cent current distribution of ordinary income is present.8 3 With REIT's,
however, there is no provision corresponding to § 852(b)(3)(D). Dis-
tributed capital gains are therefore taxed to REIT shareholders at
their personal rates and undistributed capital gains are taxed to the
REIT at its rate. I have found no particularly cogent justification
for this divergence from the investment company tax pattern. The
treatment of REIT's should be made completely parallel to that of
investment companies.
C. Deviations from Full Integration
The corporate tax on an investment company's capital gain income
is completely integrated with the shareholder-level tax on that income,
by the Carter Commission method-except that there is no withholding
at the corporate level of the taxes to be paid on distributed capital
gains. The corporate tax on an investment company's ordinary in-
come is only partially integrated: the company gets a dividends paid
deduction, but only if the 90 percent triggering requirement is met.
One is tempted to ask why the Code's treatment of investment com-
panies' undistributed capital gains was not applied to their undistrib-
uted ordinary income as well. If such an approach had been followed,
the 90 percent current distribution of ordinary income requirement
would have been unnecessary, because tax avoidance through the re-
tention of earnings could not possibly succeed. An investment com-
pany would then be free to adopt any income distribution policy
which it and its shareholders wanted, without any risk to the federal
treasury. The only answer suggested by an examination of the present
81. H.R. REP. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1960) (reasons for bill). It was thought
"desirable to remove taxation to the extent possible as a factor in determining the
relative size of investments in stock or securities, on the one hand, and real estate
equities and mortgages on the other. This is particularly important at the present time
because of the shortage of private capital and mortgage money for individual homes,
apartment houses, office buildings, factories, and hotels."
82. E.g., § 856(c).
83. § 857(a)(1).
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history of the tax provisions is that the existing tax pattern is the
accidental result of the particular way in which different elements of
the investment company tax provisions were added to the Code. By
the same token, this appreciation of the accidental nature of the his-
torical evolution should encourage us to adopt the full integration
technique in its entirety.
III. Banks and Thrift Institutions: A Quasi-
Conventional "Overtax" Pattern
A. Introduction
Commercial banks comprise by far the largest single group of first
order financial intermediaries.8 4 They may be chartered under federal
or state law,8s and are virtually"0 unique in that their capital-supplying
customers can open demand deposit accounts (checking accounts) 7
with them, as well as savings accounts88 and time deposits.89 On the
investment side, they have historically concentrated on relatively short
term business loans. These still comprise the largest class of invest-
ments in their portfolios, and are followed by holdings in United
States government securities and tax-exempt municipal securities.90
Because of legal restraints, commercial banks own very little common
stock in their own right.
84. See notes 3-10 supra.
85. See 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1970) (organization of national banks). The net of federal
regulation is wide and complex. All but a handful of the nation's state or federally
chartered commercial banks are members of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
National banks are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency and-since they are
all members of the Federal Reserve System-by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. Many state banks are also members of the Federal Reserve System.
See generally STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, supra note 22, at 55-65.
86. In some states, thrift institutions may allow customers to write "negotiable orders
of withdrawal" against savings accounts. These orders are functionally similar to checks
drawn on a demand deposit account. See Riordan, Negotiable Orders of Withdrawal, 30
Bus. LAW. 151 (1974).
87. "Demand deposits" are defined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as
all deposits which are not time deposits or savings deposits (see notes 88, 89 infra). 12
C.F.R. § 329.1(a) (1974). The term includes deposit accounts as to which the depositor
can legally demand repayment in less than 30 days. Interest may not be paid on demand
deposits. 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
88. 12 C.F.R. § 329.1(e) (1974):
The term "savings deposit" means a deposit ... [w]ith respect to which the depositor
is not required by the deposit contract but may at any time be required by the bank
to give notice in writing of an intended withdrawal not less than 30 days before
such withdrawal is made and which is not payable on a specified date or . . .
time ....
89. Time deposits include time certificates of deposit and open account time de-
posits. Generally with these deposits, a 30-day waiting period is not just a right reserved
by the bank, but is required of the depositor and noted in the instrument or contract.
12 C.F.R. § 329.1(b), (c), (d) (1974). The FDIC regulates interest payments on savings
deposits and time deposits with insured commercial banks. 12 C.F.R. § 329.3 (1974).
90. 1974 FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 3, at 33.
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Thrift institutions, which include savings and loan associations and
mutual savings banks, historically were conceived as serving the dual
purpose of promoting thrift among small savers in local communities
and providing mortgage loans for the purchase of residential housing. 9t
Their principal sources of capital are the time deposits and savings
accounts of their depositors, as they generally do not offer demand
deposit accounts or checking services.92 They usually invest the bulk
of their funds in mortgage loans, though they also hold portfolios of
United States government and municipal securities and some cor-
porate bonds.93 All federally chartered savings and loan associations
are in mutual form. There are no stockholders, and the depositors
theoretically "own" the intermediary9 4-a fact reflected in the practice,
only recently curtailed, 95 of calling the depositors "share" savings ac-
countholders and referring to the interest paid them as "dividends,"
even though a depositor's status was clearly that of a creditor. At one
time, thrift institutions were truly mutual in the sense that consumer
cooperatives now are: their customers (the borrowers from them),
were usually also depositors. A vestige of this communal ideal per-
sists in the practice of deeming borrowers to be "members" of the
association and giving them a token vote. 96 Mutual savings banks
are all state chartered and are, of course, in mutual form; state
chartered savings and loan associations may be organized as mutual
or stock organizations. Among all thrift institutions, those in mutual
form predominateYt
B. Present Tax Treatment
Banks and thrift institutions are taxed in a similar manner to cor-
porations and pay the same rate of tax on their taxable income.,,
Their depositors, even those with claims against mutual organizations,
are taxed as creditors. Interest payments to depositors in a commercial
bank are thus deductible by the bank and taxed as ordinary income
to the depositor; by a special provision, 9 even payments to depositors
91. As to federal savings and loan associations, these purposes were clearly enunciated
by Congress. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970).
92. But see note 86 supra.
93. 1974 FLow OF FUNDS, supra note 3, at 34.
94. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b) (1970); Elliot v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 233 F.
Supp. 578 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Wisconsin Bankers' Ass'n v. Robertson, 190 F. Supp. 90(D.D.C. 1960), afj'd, 294 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 938 (1961), rehearing
denied, 368 U.S. 979 (1962).
95. As to federal savings and loan associations, see 12 C.F.R. § 545.1-3 (1974), imple-
menting Pub. L. No. 90-448, 83 Stat. 476 (1968). ABA HANDBOOK OF SAVINGS AND LOAN
LAW 36-37 (1973).
96. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(4) (charter N) (1974).
97. U.S. SAVINGS & LOAN LEAGUE, 1973 SAVINGS AND LOAN FACr BOOK.
98. § 11.
99. § 591; cf. § 7701(a)(19) (definition of "domestic building and loan association").
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in thrift institutions which are denominated "dividends" are treated
as interest.
There are two major exceptions to the general rule that banks and
thrift institutions are taxed like other corporations. The first is the
Code provision'0 0 that sales or exchanges of debt securities (bonds,
debentures, notes, or certificates or other evidences of indebtedness)
by banks and thrift institutions are not to be treated as sales or ex-
changes of capital assets, but instead as giving rise to ordinary income
and losses. Since banks own little common stock, the possibility of
preferentially taxed capital gains from the sale of stock is of minor
consequence. Since banks typically do not trade extensively in the
notes received from their business loans, the provision chiefly affects
their sales of United States government and municipal securities.
The history of this treatment of debt securities is illuminating. The
Tax Reform Act of 1969101 substituted the current Code provision,
subsection 582(c), for the prior rule that, though gains from sales of
debt securities by banks and thrift institutions were taxed as capital
gains, losses from such sales were treated as ordinary losses deductible
against ordinary income. Both the House and Senate reports'0 2 at
the time of the 1969 revision state that the prior rule of "nonparallel
treatment"-treating gains as capital gains and losses as ordinary losses
-was adopted in 1942 to encourage financial institutions to support
the large new issues of bonds then being offered to help finance the
war. In fact, the relevant 1942 House report had simply recommended
the proposed nonparallel treatment and noted laconically that the
treatment is recommended for banks "since bonds are a necessary type
of investment for them."' 03 Nonparallel treatment was introduced into
100. § 582(c)(1).
101. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 433(a), 83 Stat. 623 (1969).
102. H.R. REt. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 129, 130 (1969).
103. H. REP. No. 2333, H.R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1942). The corresponding
Senate Report does not even add the laconic comment. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 119 (1942). Originally the proposal covered bond sales by insurance companies, too;
this aspect was dropped in favor of continuing the then existing rule that capital gains
and losses of insurance companies, being likely to produce little revenue, were exempt.
Id. at 32 (citing as an additional reason for inertia the burden placed on the insurance
companies of separating their assets by dates of purchase). The House bill provided
for the special treatment of bank and insurance company bond losses and, for the first
time, included capital gains in the gross income of insurance companies. But the bill
which passed the Senate undid the changes regarding insurance companies. Compare
H.R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) (as passed by the House), §§ 136(d)(1), 201(c)(1),
in REVENUE AcT OF 1942, BILL IN VARIOUS FORMS Pt. 1 (Carlton Fox compilation, Yale
Law Library) with H.R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) (as passed by Senate), §§ (131)(d),
(205), deleting § 201(c)(1), in REVENUE AcT oF 1942, BILL IN VARIOUS FoaMs, supra, pt. 2.
The present treatment of insurance companies' capital gains and losses is similar to
that of ordinary corporations. See §§ 802(a)(2) (life insurance companies), 821(f(2) (mu-
tual fire and casualty companies), 831(c)(1) (stock fire and casualty companies).
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the tax laws in 1942 to benefit taxpayers who suffered wartime involun-
tary conversions not followed by replacement of the converted proper-
ty-for example, a shipper whose ship was destroyed by the enemy at
sea and thus converted into insurance proceeds.104 In a questionable
extension of the policy, the same treatment was given to what are
now called § 1231 assets-certain real property and other, depreciable
property used in a trade or business-on the theory that the war was
indirectly forcing many businesses to sell such assets and that it would
be too difficult to distinguish involuntary war-related sales from those
which were not. 0 5 It may well be that the nonparallel treatment
given in 1942 to bond sales by banks was a further extension of this
notion, perhaps by a combination of mindless analogizing-viewing
a bank's investment bond portfolio as functionally similar to an ordi-
nary business's stock of depreciable property-and a deliberate con-
gressional effort to encourage bank purchases of government securities.
Although § 1231 is still with us, a vestige long outliving its purpose,
Congress acted in 1969 to remove the favorable nonparallel treatment
of sales or exchanges of debt securities by banks and thrift institutions.
A change more consonant with the treatment of the securities trading
of other, arguably similar financial intermediaries, such as fire and
casualty insurance companies, would have been to consider the gains
and losses from such sales as capital gains and capital losses, since only
a few large banks which make markets in government securities can
realistically be thought of as dealers in securities. The bond portfolios
of most banks are designated, thought of, and managed as investment
portfolios, and the securities are considered to be investment securi-
ties by regulators. 10 6 The 1969 act, however, treats both the gains
and the losses as ordinary. Congress felt that banks' portfolios of debt
securities should be considered inventory in their hands, because of
both the "size" of banks' holdings and "the extent of their transac-
tions" in them. 0 7 In addition, Congress realized that banks and thrift
institutions were reducing their taxes by bunching the realization of
bond gains and losses in separate years.' 08
104. B. BiTrKm & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 578-79 (4th
ed. 1972).
105. Id.
106. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.12 (1975) (Comptroller of the Currency's investment se-
curities regulation). To be sure, the connotations are different. For tax law purposes,
one would focus on whether securities are held for investment purposes; the Comp-
troller's regulation distinguishes investment securities themselves from those which are
"predominantly speculative in nature." 12 C.F.R. § 1.3(b) (1975).
107. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 166, 167 (1969).
108. Id. For a discussion and illustration of the principle of not offsetting gains and
losses in the same year and of the significant tax benefits that banks could realize prior
to 1969 by utilizing the principle, see FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 13ANKS AND FINANCIAL
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A second major exception to the principle that banks and thrift in-
stitutions are taxed like ordinary corporations has received more at-
tention in recent years because it affects the competitive position of
banks as against thrift institutions. The deduction for additions to
bad debt reserves is of enormous importance to both banks and thrift
institutions because the assets of banks and thrift institutions consist
predominantly of business loans and mortgage loans, respectively. In
lieu of a deduction for the charge-off of specific bad debts as they be-
come worthless, ordinary taxpayers, including corporations, are al-
lowed a deduction for a "reasonable" addition to a reserve for bad
debts. 109 This reserve is an accounting device for smoothing out the
impact on reported annual income of fluctuations in bad debts. The
corresponding regulations'" give the Service flexibility in dealing with
different kinds of industries and the different experiences of individual
taxpayers with bad debts. Banks and thrift institutions, however, have
the benefit of special statutory provisions,"' which derive from earlier
administrative rulings,"12 that allow an especially generous deduction
for additions to bad debt reserves. The deduction may be computed
under two separate methods. The first limits the size of the reserve
to a stated percentage of eligible loans, which percentage is based on
an industrywide 20-year experience with bad debts during a period
spanning the Depression era. This method yields deductions consider-
ably in excess of modem bad debt experience. 13 In recognition of
its overgenerous treatment, the Code now contains a schedule calling
for a periodic scaledown of the maximum percentage of allowable re-
serves, from 1.8 percent for taxable years beginning before 1976 to
a more realistic 0.6 percent for taxable years beginning after 1981.11
The second, and conceptually sounder, method limits additions to re-
INSTITtr!ONS, supra note 26, at 1741-43. As the discussion indicates, the principle still
has its uses. At the present time, the major incentive for banks to avoid the status of
dealers in securities has been reduced since, regardless of their status, all sales of debt
securities give rise to ordinary gain or loss. Indeed, there is now some incentive to
obtain dealer status, since by doing so a bank may be able to adopt favorable inventory
valuation methods. Id. at 1802, 1808-11.
109. § 166(c).
110. Treas. Reg. 1.664-4(b)(1) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6728, 1964-1 Cum. Bull. 195.
111. §§ 585, 593.
112. See Schoeneman & McCoy, The Bad Debt Reserves of Financial Institutions, 11
WMs. & MARY L. R v. 797, 799 n.12 (1970) (list of relevant rulings).
113. A 1969 House report asserted that if commercial banks were subject to the same
bad debt reserve rules as taxpayers generally, they would be allowed to build up a
bad debt reserve of, on the average, less than 0.2 percent of outstanding noninsured
loans, rather than the 2.4 percent reserve then allowed to them. H.R. REP. No. 91-413,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 120-21 (1969). Bad debt losses of banks for 1974 were reported to
be unusually large, but they do not seem to have been enough to justify revoking the
gradual scaledown in the statute of the maximum percentages.
114. § 585(b)(2).
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serves in terms of a six-year moving average of the individual bank's
actual bad debt experience. 115
The Code gives thrift institutions, but not commercial banks, the
option, not only of using the better of the percentage method or the
experience method, but also of using a third method for computing
the maximum addition to its reserve for losses on its "qualifying real
property loans": 110 the addition may not exceed a statutory percentage
of the institution's taxable income for the year."7 This third method
results in a much lower effective" s rate of tax for thrift institutions
than for commercial banks. Again in recognition of the tax bonanza
that it had created, Congress has provided a periodic scaledown of
the statutory ceiling on the addition to bad debt reserves for qualify-
ing real property loans, from 60 percent of taxable income beginning
in 1969 to 40 percent for a taxable year beginning in 1979 or there-
after.
Regardless of which of the three methods is used, there is an overall
constraint on the addition to the reserve for losses on qualifying real
property loans. The addition can in no case exceed the larger of (1)
the addition which would be permitted under the experience method
or (2) the amount which, added to the addition to the reserve for
losses on other loans, equals the excess of 12 percent of total deposits
at the end of the taxable year over the sum of the institution's surplus,
undivided profits, and reserves at the beginning of the year."19 This
peculiar overall constraint, which at first glance may appear to be a
meaningless jumble of unrelated concepts and arbitrary tests, actually
provides the best clue to the policy behind the favorable treatment
afforded thrift institutions by the percentage of taxable income meth-
od. The overall constraint provides in essence that, unless the institu-
tion's recent bad debt experience was sufficiently extraordinary to
warrant an exception, the institution's bad debt reserves, together with
its undivided profits and surplus (some part of which may be required
by governing nontax law) cannot be accumulated tax-free beyond 12
percent of total deposits. This lumping of the bad debt reserves with
115. § 585(b) (3).
116. § 593(b)(1)(B). Regardless of the method used for the qualifying loans, non-
qualifying loans are governed by the experience method. § 593(b)(1)(A).
117. § 593(b)(1)(B).
118. Use of the term "effective" in this context implies that one has in mind a given
tax base that is a normative reference point and from which the law deviates. It is,
in a sense, a way of stating that the income of banks and thrift institutions ought to
be computed in the same way, rather than a reason for equal treatment. See gcnerally
Bittker, Effective Tax Rates: Fact or Fancy? 122 U. PA. L. REv. 780 (1974).
119. § 593(b)(l)(B)(i)-(ii).
1634
Vol. 84: 1603, 1975
The Federal Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries
surplus and undivided profits in the formula suggests that Congress
viewed the reserves not primarily as an account which should accu-
rately reflect a reasonable expectation of actual losses on loans, but
as a functional substitute for the capital stock account of an ordinary
stock corporation-the "cushion of equity capital" which every sound
business enterprise is supposed to have. 120 This interpretation is bol-
stered by the fact that Congress was apparently oblivious to the ex-
istence of the large California stock savings and loan associations when
it enacted the predecessor of the overall constraint, and thus appar-
ently thought that the thrift institutions benefiting from the special
bad debt reserve provisions were all organized in mutual form.' 21
Viewed in this way, however, the special tax treatment of thrift in-
stitution bad debt reserves is open to the criticism that mutual thrift
institutions should be restricted to augmenting their retained earnings
account with after-tax dollars, in the same manner that banks and
ordinary corporations must. It might be argued in response that stock
corporations get an initial injection of capital from the stockholders'
capital contribution which is not taxed to the corporation,2 -2 and
that mutuals should therefore have an opportunity for the tax-free
acquisition of a roughly comparable reserve. 23 Since capital contri-
butions to a corporation do not represent its own earned income from
operations, however, the argument is not persuasive.
C. Deviations from Full Integration
Bank and thrift institution income is taxed on the conventional
corporate model, although the computation of their income is different
from that of ordinary corporations in those respects already indicated.
Nevertheless, the tax on bank and thrift institutions' income is in ef-
fect partially integrated with the tax on public suppliers of capital,
because interest payments to depositors are deductible by the institu-
tion and taxable to the depositors at their personal rates. This for-
tuitous result is not, of course, the consequence of a conscious policy
of integration, but instead results from the legal characterization of
depositors as creditors. Apart from the lack of integration with respect
to bank and thrift institution shareholders (elite suppliers of capital),
the pattern departs from the Carter Commission model in (1) its failure
120. See Lent, Comparative Tax Treatment of Mutual Savings Institutions and Com-
mercial Banks, in 3 TAx RiEvISioN CONIPENDIUM, supra note 75, at 1767, 1775.
121. See id. at 1778.
122. § 118; cf. § 1032(a).
123. Cf. Keith, The Corporation Income Tax and Its Application to Mutual Finance
Companies, in 3 TAX REVISioN COMPENDIUM, supra note 75, at 1783, 1792-93.
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to withhold a portion of the tax on depositors' interest at the entity
level, and (2) its failure to allocate, and then tax in an integrated
manner, undistributed income of the institution. The former dis-
crepancy is only a problem of efficient tax collection procedures, but
probably results in serious underreporting of interest income by in-
dividual depositors. The latter defect stems from the fact that there
is no feasible basis for allocation. Even mutual thrift institutions,
which the depositors theoretically own, cannot realistically allocate un-
distributed income to particular depositors, any one of whom may well
sever his connection with the institution without having received the
benefit of undistributed entity income.12 4 In this respect depositors
are unlike mutual fund shareholders, and complete integration with
respect to depositors is not presently feasible.
Since depositors are characterized as creditors, and all interest paid
to them is deductible, a bank heedless of its shareholders, or a mutual
thrift institution, might try to eliminate all tax on itself by paying
out all current income as interest to depositors. Neither is, in fact,
free to do so. A coordinated phalanx of regulations imposes interest
rate ceilings on savings accounts and time deposits at both commercial
banks and thrift institutions. Even a thrift institution with all the
reserves it wants and without any efficient investment opportunities
for its recent earnings may be forced to keep some of those earnings.
Mutual financial institutions would in any event retain some earnings
for many of the business reasons for which stock corporations accumu-
late them-for example, to provide for growth, to seize opportunities
that provide a better return than the depositors could get for them-
selves, or to boost the social status of the managing group. Thus, a
bank or thrift institution cannot in practice achieve full integration
of the entity tax on itself with the personal tax on its depositors by
currently distributing all income to its depositors.
Unlike investment companies and REIT's, banks and thrift insti-
tutions face no minimum distribution requirement before integrated
treatment is given to amounts actually distributed to depositors. That
is, banks and thrift institutions need distribute no minimum amount
to public suppliers of capital to avoid double taxation (at the entity
and the personal levels) of the institution's earnings allocated to those
public suppliers.
Since banks and thrift institutions are formally taxed like ordinary
124. A depositor in a mutual thrift institution might share in residual earnings upon
the institution's liquidation, merger, or conversion into stock form. All three kinds of
events are relatively rare.
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corporations but receive special treatment in some aspects of the com-
putation of their income, their tax treatment may be described as a
quasi-conventional overtax pattern. Nevertheless, because depositors,
who are the predominant source of funds for these institutions, are
technically creditors, this pattern in effect allows a substantial degree
of integration of the tax on the institution with the tax on the public
suppliers of capital. Under the present system, only income allocable
to the elite suppliers of capital, the shareholders, is not integrated.
IV. Life Insurance Companies: A Unique "Undertax" Pattern
A. Introduction
After commercial banks and savings and loan associations, life in-
surance companies are the third largest group of first order financial
intermediaries. In contrast to banks, they are organized and regulated
almost exclusively under state law, but like thrift institutions they
may exist as stock or mutual organizations. They invest principally
in corporate bonds and mortgages on property other than homes. Their
capital structures tend to be simple, because they rarely issue debt
instruments to ordinary creditors. Their major liabilities are those
owed their policyholders.
At one time life insurance companies received extremely favorable
federal income tax treatment. Although the law was tightened in 1959
in order to produce a greater tax yield from them, the treatment they
receive under the Internal Revenue Code is still generous. The de-
tailed mechanics of the special tax provisions applicable to life in-
surance companies are so peculiar and convoluted, and the reasons
behind them so difficult to ascertain from the Code itself, that I must
present a more extended exposition of their tax treatment than I have
for other financial institutions, before I draw any general conclusions
about the overall tax pattern.
In order to understand the taxation of life insurance companies,
one must first grasp the different economic components of the ordinary
whole life insurance policy.1  From the policyholder's viewpoint, the
premiums he pays for his policy can be divided into three constituent
parts. One portion goes toward commission expense and similar, im-
125. See J. MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 13-16, 21-23 (9th ed. 1962); D. McGILL, LIFE IN-
SURANCE 58-70 (rev. ed. 1967); R. MEHR & R. OSLER, MODERN LIFE INSURANCE 51-55 (rev.
ed. 1956); Williams, Contracts-Whole Life, in D. GREGG, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE
HANDBOOK 50-58 (2d ed. 1964); Vickrey, Insurance under the Federal Income Tax, 52 YALE
L.J. 554, 560-62 (1943). In the ordinary whole life policy, coverage is provided throughout
the insured's life and fixed-amount or "level" premiums are payable continuously
throughout his life.
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mediately payable expenses from which the policyholder can derive no
further value. A second portion covers pure insurance protection, that
is, protection against the risk of dying prematurely (a protection made
possible because the company can pool the premiums contributed by
many policyholders). A third portion goes toward building up a re-
trievable investment, or "cash surrender value," akin to a savings de-
posit in a bank or thrift institution. The relative proportions of pre-
miums going into the latter two categories varies greatly according
to the kind of life insurance contract purchased. At one extreme is
the short period "term" insurance policy, which has no savings ele-
ment for the policyholder, since the policy has no cash surrender
value. 2 6 At the other extreme is the single premium endowment
policy in which the premium is paid in advance; such a policy con-
tains a very small pure insurance element. 2 7 Many other types of poli-
cies lie between these extremes. The ordinary whole life policy, for
example, can be viewed as a combination of a decreasing term in-
surance policy with a savings deposit.1
2
On the company's side, the analysis is roughly similar. After the
payment of commissions and other expenses immediately incurred in
issuing the policy, an insurance company invests its premium receipts
and carries the investments on its books as assets of the company. As
balance sheet liabilities against these assets, however, the company must
set up "reserves" to meet its obligations under its policies. '2 9 These
126. See J. MACLEAN, supra note 125, at 28-34; D. McGiLL, supra note 125, at 43-52;
R. MEHR & R. OsLER, supra note 125, at 34-45; Beadles, Contract-Term Insurance, in
D. GREGG, supra note 125, at 37-49. A term policy offers financial protection against
death within the time stated in the policy. It offers no protection or values in case of
survival beyond the specified period.
127. See J. MACLEAN, supra note 125, at 25-28; D. McGILL, supra note 125, at 71-76;
R. MEHR & R. OsLER, supra note 125, at 45-49; Black, Contracts-Endowment, in D.
GREcc, supra note 125, at 63-72.
Endowment insurance provides not only for payment of the face amount of the policy
in the event of the insured's death during a specified period of years, but also for
payment of the full face amount at the end of the period if the insured is living.
As an economic matter, it may be viewed as a combination of decreasing term insurance
and increasing investment. Especially when the premiums are paid over a short period
and the maturity is relatively long, it might be called a savings fund protected by term
insurance.
128. Annuities are in many ways the obverse of life insurance. Because annuities are
similar to life insurance contracts in combining a savings and a risk-spreading element,
they both are considered in determining whether a company is a "life insurance com-
any" for tax purposes. § 801(a), (b)(1)(B). See generally J. MACLEAN, supra note 125, at
3-67; D. McGILL, supra note 125, at 81-105; R. MEHR 9: R. OSLER, supra note 125, at
69-87; Mehr, Contracts-Annuities, in D. GREGG, supra note 125, at 73-86.
For the sake of simplicity, the taxation of annuities is not considered as a separate
subject in this article.
129. See J. MACLEAN, supra note 125, at 111-26; D. McGILL, supra note 125, at 218-45,
276-90; R. MEHR & R. OSLER, supra note 125, at 553-58. Mehr and Osler stress that
"there is no such thing as a reserve for an individual policy," since the assets held to
meet the reserve liability are held in the aggregate for the benefit of all policyholders.
Id. at 557.
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reserves correspond to the savings element on the policyholder's side.
The reserves may serve as an indicator to regulators of the company's
financial soundness, 130 may limit both policyholder dividends and,
in the case of stock companies, dividends on stock, 13 1 and may help
determine the company's legally permissible investments. 32 Generally,
the reserves must equal that amount of money which, increased at an
assumed rate of interest, will yield a fund large enough to meet policy
obligations at their actuarially estimated dates of maturity. 33
By using a high assumed rate of interest in its computations, a com-
pany can reduce the size of required reserves and limit regulatory
restrictions on its activities that are based on the amount of its re-
serves. Accordingly, state law" 4 usually sets a statutory ceiling for the
assumed rate, or requires that the rate satisfy other legal conditions
designed to assure a conservative approach that will protect policy-
holders against the threat of insolvency. 3 State law will also specify,
in most cases, what mortality or morbidity tables must be used in the
computation of reserves, as well as the method of computation." 36
There are various types of life insurance reserves, which might be
classified by types of policies or features of policies. 37 Even a five
year term insurance policy has a reserve element, though of course it
bulks less large than the reserve for a whole life policy of the same
face amount.
In the early years of a policy, reserves are normally derived from
the company's surplus rather than from premiums paid on the policy,
because of high expenses during the policy's first few years. Partly
for this reason, the individual policy's cash surrender value at any
time may be less than the amount of the reserve set up by the com-
130. See J. MACLEAN, supra note 125, at 126-31 (discussion of net-level-premium
reserve as a test for insolvency).
131. Because accounted for as liabilities, policy reserves reduce the net worth of a
company. When the net worth is lower than a stock company's legal capital or a mu-
tual company's "required surplus," the capital or required surplus fund is said to be
"impaired." If such impairment is prohibited, e.g., NEW YORK INS. LAw § 95 (McKinney
1966) (impairment of mutual or reciprocal insurer), then payment of a dividend which
causes impairment is forbidden. Cf. id. § 195 (McKinney 1966) (superintendent may
disapprove dividend payment to stockholders if he finds "that the financial condition
of the company does not warrant the payment").
132. E.g., id. §§ 73, 80-81 (McKinney 1966).
133. Put otherwise, "the reserve may be defined as the difference between the present
%alue of future benefits and the present value of future net premiums." D. McGILL,
supra note 125, at 218. Computation of these present values involves making assump-
tions about future mortality experience, interest rates, policy lapses and the like.
134. State law governs because the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970), leaves the regulation of the business of insurance to the states.
135. See, e.g., NEW YORK INS. LAW § 205 (McKinney Supp. 1974-1075).
136. See, e.g., id. § 205(3).
137. See Kirkpatrick, Premiums and Reserves, in D. GaE, supra note 125, at 301,
305-08.
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pany on account of the policy. 138 Reflecting this difference, the Stan-
dard Valuation Law,139 which concerns the valuation of reserves, em-
ploys the same assumed rate limits and specified mortality tables as,
but uses different methods of computation than, the Standard Non-
forfeiture Law, 40 which defines the minimum forfeiture benefits and
cash surrender values companies must offer to policyholders.' 41 The
build-up of all policyholders' cash surrender values, then, cannot be
taken as the equivalent of the build-up of the company's reserves. In-
deed, life insurance contracts do not by their terms link the cash
surrender values set forth therein to a requirement that the company
maintain a specific amount of reserves on account of the particular
policy. The requirement that reserves be set aside is a regulatory
mandate applicable to the company as a whole, not a contractual ob-
ligation owing directly to particular policyholders. The difference be-
tween these terms creates complications 42 for proposals to reform the
tax law by eliminating the widely perceived tax-free build-up of a
policyholder's "investment."
B. Present Tax Treatment
1. Summary
a. Life insurance companies. Tax policymakers have historically
faced two major difficulties when considering the taxation of life in-
138. See J. MACLEAN, supra note 125, at 177-83. Maclean offers two other reasons to
support the idea that cash surrender values may properly be less than reserves. (1) The
reserve is an average figure of no real significance as applied to the individual policy.
It is believed that those who surrender their policies are, on the average, in better
health and more likely to live longer than those who do not. This pattern of termina-
tion means that if the company gave each surrendering policyholder the full reserve
amount, it would sustain a loss in aggregate. (2) Surrenders are more likely during
economically troubled times, when interest rates tend to be high and the company's
opportunities for earnings therefore greater. In other words, policy terminations tend
to be systematically adverse to the company. Nevertheless, the Standard Non-forfeiture
Law mentioned in the text seems to be concerned principally with the problem of high
initial expenses. Minimum values are based on the assumption that specific excess
initial expenses will be incurred and on the assumption that these expenses are amortized
over the whole of the premium paying period. Id. at 180; cf. TEX. INS. CODE art. 3.44a,
§ 5 (Supp. 1974) (computation of "adjusted premiums" under Texas Standard Non-
forfeiture Law). To speak of "the" reserve attributable to "a" policy is thought by in-
surance experts to be misleading. See note 129 supra.
139. See, e.g., TEx. INs. CODE art. 3.28 (Supp. 1974) (Texas version of Standard Valua-
tion Law). Texas law is chosen as an example because Texas is one of the three states
(Arizona, Texas, and Louisiana) that charter the largest numbers of life insurance com-
panies. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 1973, at 90.
140. See, e.g., TEX. INs. CODE art. 3.44a (Supp. 1974) (Texas version of Standard Non-
forfeiture Law).
141. The Standard Valuation Law uses the commissioners' reserve valuation method,
whereas the Standard Non-forfeiture Law uses the adjusted premiums method. For a
discussion of these methods, see D. McGILL, supra note 125, at 280-82, 295-305.
142. See pp. 1678-79 infra.
1640
The Federal Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries
surance companies: what items should be included as "income" to
the company, and whether and how additions to life insurance re-
serves should be reflected in taxable income.
The income of a life insurance company can be divided into two
separate streams. First, the company earns income in the way that
most financial intermediaries principally earn it; the company invests
receipts in securities, mortgage loans, and the like. The return on
these items, net of investment expenses, may be called its "invest-
ment income." Second, a life insurance company may realize under-
writing gains and losses, which are more specifically related to its op-
erations qua insurer. In setting its premiums, the company will act
on the basis of an assumed mortality experience. Should policyholders
outlive the assumptions, the company will pay out more slowly than
anticipated on its policies, thereby realizing "mortality gains." The
company will also have anticipated administrative expelises of a given
magnitude. Should the expenses be less than projected, the company
experiences "loading gains." Mortality gains and loading gains to-
gether make up "underwriting gains." 14 3 Underwriting gains should
probably be considered taxable income; the company provides a ser-
vice, insurance protection, for a price, and if its costs are less than
that price it makes a profit which appears to be like that of any other
corporation.
Life insurance companies could conceivably take deductions on ac-
count of obligations to policyholders at one of two times. They could
take deductions only when these obligations accrue, that is, when they
become payable by reason of the death of the insured or otherwise.
Alternatively, they might take deductions or exclusions when additions
are made to the policy reserves, on the theory that, though the policy
obligations have not matured, they are real, substantial, and statistical-
ly predictable. A failure to take deductions when additions are made
could constitute unrealistic accounting, especially for rapidly growing
or shrinking companies. On the other hand, while ordinary corpora-
tions can establish reserves for bad debts, they generally cannot deduct
additions to reserves for contingent. liabilities, despite the fact that the
liabilities may be statistically predictable with a high degree of accu-
racy. For example, an automobile manufacturer on the accrual method
143. "Underwriting gains" is a tax law term. Basic insurance texts often describe
a "surplus" made up of "mortality savings," "excess interest" and "loading savings."
D. MCGILL, supra note 125, at 326. See also J. MACLEAN, supra note 125, at 142.
"Underwriting gains" are viewed more precisely in the tax law as the difference be-
tween the gain from total operations of a life insurance company and the company's
portion of its investment income. S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1959).
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cannot deduct from its taxable income additions to a reserve established
for predicted product warranty payments. Indeed, when a Code provi-
sion (§ 462) was added in 1954 to allow all taxpayers a deduction for
reasonable additions to reserves for expenses that could be estimated
with reasonable accuracy, it proved to have a woefully short life. This
concession to generally accepted accounting principles was repealed
in 1955 on the ground that it would create a serious revenue loss dur-
ing the transitional period.14 4 The problem can therefore be phrased
as whether life insurance companies deserve special treatment in this
regard, on the ground that policy obligations are so long term and
form such a large element of their business that not to use a reserve
method of accounting for those obligations would be extremely un-
realistic. The tax law has accepted this general position for many
years, 145 and its acceptance seems sound. The special tax accounting
treatment of policy reserves is perhaps the greatest conceptual differ-
ence between the taxation of life insurance companies and ordinary
corporations.
We turn from general concepts to the actual tax pattern. The Code
imposes a tax, at regular corporate tax rates, on "life insurance com-
pany taxable income."' 46 There is an alternative tax on long term
capital gains which is similar to the alternative tax on capital gains
realized by ordinary corporations. 47 Life insurance company taxable
income is defined 48 as the sum of three elements, or "phases." The
first phase is "taxable investment income," which can best be under-
stood as the company's income from investments, net of investment-
related expenses and minus the policyholders' share of that income. 1 4
144. See B. BrrriKm & L. STONE, supra note 99, at 837-38.
145. Under the Revenue Acts prior to 1921 (1909 Act, § 38; 1913 Act, § IIG; 1916
Act, §§ 10, 12; 1918 Act, §§ 233, 234) premium receipts were included in the gross
income of all insurance companies, but a reserve deduction was provided for the purpose
of postponing the taxation of these receipts until "earned." 8 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 44.01, at 44-4 n.3 (1970). The 1921 Act taxed life insurance com-
panies only on their investment income, thus making the question of when to treat
premium receipts as accrued or "earned" income irrelevant; but deductions for net
additions required by law to be made to reserves were still allowed. Id. at 44-5; id.
§ 44.15, at 44-35. For an account of the special meaning of the phrase "reserves re-
quired by law," see T. NASH, FEDERAL TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES § 6.01[2],




149. § 804(a)(2) defines taxable investment income as an amount equal to the amount
(if any) by which net long term capital gain exceeds net short term capital loss plus
the life insurance company's share of each item of investment yield (including tax-
exempt interest, partially tax-exempt interest, and dividends received), reduced by certain
deductions allowed by other Code sections for interest on government obligations, par-
tially tax-exempt interest, and dividends received and by the small business deduction,
equal to 10 percent of the investment yield up to .25,000, provided in § 804(a)(4).
To obtain the "investment yield," one must first compute "gross investment income,"
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The policyholders' share is a function of the company's "policy and
other contract liability requirements,"'1 0 which means at its simplest
the investment income the company is permitted to allocate to its in-
surance policy reserves plus the interest it pays on indebtedness to
others, such as holders of its bonds.' 5 ' Given the nature of the in-
surance business, the exclusion for these allocations means that some-
thing like 70 percent of the insurance company's net investment in-
come may go untaxed to the company.' 52 The exclusion for the policy-
holders' share rests on the notion that policyholders are basically credi-
tors, and that allocating amounts to reserves for later maturing obliga-
tions is similar to making interest payments to creditors, which are
deductible.
The second phase of life insurance company taxable income can be
defined in § 804(b) as the sum of (1) income generally from interest, dividends, rents,
and royalties, (2) the amount (if any) by which net short term capital gain exceeds net
long term capital loss, and (3) income from any noninsurance trade or business except
that income included in (1). Except as provided in (2), gain from the sale or exchange
of a capital asset or gain considered as gain from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset is not included.
§ 804(c) defines "investment yield" as the gross investment income less (1) investment
expenses, (2) taxes and other 'expenses exclusively on or with respect to real estate
owned by the company, (3) depreciation allowed by § 167, (4) depletion allowed by
§ 511, and (5) noninsurance trade or business deductions excluding (a) losses from the
sale or exchange of capital assets or property used in the trade or business and from
compulsory or involuntary conversions of property used in the trade or business, (b)
any item to the extent attributable to the carrying on of the insurance business, and(c) the net operating loss deduction in § 172 and the special deduction for corporations
provided in §§ 241-50.
150. As defined in § 805(a) the term "policy and other contract liability requirements,"
is the sum of
(1) The adjusted life insurance reserves [§ 805(c)(1)], multiplied by the adjusted
reserves rate [§ 805(c)(2)],
(2) The mean of the pensionplan reserves [§ 805(d)] at the beginning and end
of the taxable year, multiplied by the current earnings rate [§ 805(b)(2)], and
(3) The interest paid [§ 805(e)].
151. Since life insurance companies issue no or small amounts of debt securities, the
deduction for interest paid is not nearly as important a factor as additions to policy
reserves.
152. The staff of the Senate Committee on Finance estimated that the average policy
and other contract liability requirement deduction would "work out to be somewhere
around 75 percent." Hearings on H.R. 4245 Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 256 (1959). See also J. MACLEAN, supra note 125, at 529: "The 1959 law
taxes on the average, about 25 percent of [net investment] income."
The 1955 formula for taxing life insurance companies assumed that each company
needed approximately 85 percent of its net investment income for additions to reserves.
S. REP. No. 291, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 129 (1959) (Supplemental views of Sens. Douglas
and Gore).
Dr. Gerard Brannon of the Department of Economics of Georgetown University has
statistics, as yet unpublished, on this question. He states that based on 1972 data, the
phase one tax base is approximately 28 percent of net investment income, i.e., 72
percent of the insurance company's net investment income is untaxed because of the§ 805 calculation. Interview with Dr. Gerard Brannon, Apr. 24, 1975 (telephone). Dr.
Brannon explained that the insurance company's share is increasing in this period of
rising interest rates. The § 805 formula is very, sensitive to interest rates; the higher
the rate of interest, the larger will be the insurance company's share of net investment
income. See note 186 inIra.
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characterized roughlya 3 as one-half of the company's underwriting in-
come-or more precisely, 50 percent of the excess of its "gain from
operations" (its total income'54) over taxable investment income. 5
In figuring total income or gain from operations in phase two, the
taxable investment income component is again reduced by the "policy-
holders' share" of that component but, oddly and perhaps pointless-
ly,:56 the mechanics and the result of the computation are different.
Moreover, the taxable half of underwriting income is net of policy-
holder dividends. Thus, a mutual company, or a stock company which
issues a great many participating policies, can reduce or eliminate its
underwriting income for tax purposes simply by declaring policy-
holder dividends and taking a deduction therefor. Policyholder div-
idends can also be deducted against phase one taxable investment
income, but only up to a ceiling of $250,000. That ceiling applies,
however, only to dividends; underwriting losses not caused by the
declaration of policyholder dividends can be fully deducted against
taxable income.
The third phase of an insurance company's taxable income is im-
posed only on stock life insurance companies, and is based on the
"amount subtracted from the policyholders' surplus account" for the
taxable year.' 57 The policyholders' surplus account is essentially the
account into which the untaxed one-half of previous years' underwrit-
ing income has been placed. When the account builds up beyond
certain limits, or when distributions to shareholders are deemed made
out of it, the company finally pays the tax. The limits are of no
concern to most companies, 53 however, and distributions are deemed
153. See pp. 1655-56 infra, for an explanation as to why the phase two tax base
is not composed entirely of underwriting gains.
154. § 809(b).
155. § 802(b)(2).
156. See pp. 1656-57 infra.
157. §§ 802(b)(3), 815.
158. The limitations are set forth in § 815(d)(4):
There shall be treated as a subtraction from the policyholders surplus account . . .
the amount by which the policyholders surplus account . . . exceeds whichever
of the following is the greatest-
(A) 15 percent of life insurance reserves at the end of the taxable year,
(B) 25 percent of the amount by which the life insurance reserves at the end of
the taxable year exceed the life insurance reserves at the end of 1958, or
(C) 50 percent of the net amount of the premiums and other consideration taken
into account for the taxable year under section 809(c)(1).
These limits are not likely to be reached. Hearings on H.R. 4245 Before the Sen. Comm.
on Finance, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29, 274, 587, 669 (1959); S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 131 (1959) (supplemental views of Sens. Douglas and Gore); J. MACLEAN, supra
note 125, at 532; T. NAsH, supra note 145, § 8.02[2], at 8-13.
After sampling 40 companies of various sizes, Dr. Gerard Brannon of Georgetown Uni-
versity's Department of Economics concluded that the § 815(d)(4) limitations were set
so high in comparison to the companies' phase three accounts that he would not con-
sider the phase three tax in his analyses. Brannon Interview, supra note 152.
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to come first out of taxed income. For all its complexity and noble
intentions, the phase three computation adds very little to life insur-
ance company taxable income. 159
b. The life insurance policyholder and beneficiary. Premium pay-
ments for life insurance are not deductible, but life insurance pro-
ceeds received in a lump sum upon the death of the insured are ex-
empt from income tax. 60 The reason appears to be that the benefi-
ciary receives something similar to a bequest, which is not treated as
income. Bequests, however, generally represent after-income-tax ac-
cumulations-the deceased or his own donor presumably paid income
tax on the bequeathed wealth as he earned it. In contrast, the insured
covered by a life insurance policy will not have paid income tax at
any time on the income earned by the company with respect to his
policy.
A beneficiary of a life insurance policy may often receive his benefits
in periodic payments rather than in a lump sum. Should a beneficiary
receive such payments, the total amount he will collect over time will
exceed the face value of the policy, because the insurance company
will pay him interest on that portion of the original lump sum which
it has not yet distributed to him. Under such an optional payout
plan, the beneficiary does incur income tax liability, but only for
that portion of the payments which represents the after-death interest
paid by the company.""
If policy proceeds are payable, not by reason of death, but on ma-
turity or surrender of the policy, the policyholder is taxed only on
the excess of what he receives over the premiums he has paid.162 In
most ordinary forms of insurance the cash surrender value or other
amounts available to a living policyholder will usually be less than
the premiums he has paid, so that no taxable income will result on
159. Dr. Brannon has agreed with the view that the phase three tax produces little
revenue. Brannon Interview, supra note 152; see note 158 supra.
The Internal Revenue Service itself has no statistics which break down life insurance
company taxes by phases. Interview with Art Gianelos, Corporation Statistics Division,
IRS, May 1, 1975 (telephone).
There are indications in the Senate hearings on the Life Insurance Company Income
Tax Act of 1959 that the phase three tax was never intended as a revenue raising
measure. Hearings on H.R. 4245 Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 26-28, 219, 588 (1959).
160. § 101.
161. § 101(d). Actually, an amount akin to the lump sum is pro rated over the payout
period, and only the portions of payments in excess of these pro rated amounts are
taxed. For the individual beneficiary who receives life insurance proceeds on an annuity
basis and who dies earlier than expected, this means that some income tax will have
been imposed even though the total amount received was less than the amount that
would have been received tax free under a lump sum option. Conversely, the beneficiary
who outlives his or her life expectancy obtains a tax bargain.
162. § 72(e)(1).
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surrender of the policy. 1 13 Cash surrender value is usually less than
the aggregate of premiums paid because the amounts an insured has
paid for pure insurance protection will ordinarily have exceeded the
interest allocated to the reserve for his policy; in addition, the cash
surrender value is often smaller than the reserve. In other words,
even where the Code does attempt to tax the interest earnings allo-
cated to a policy, it not only defers the tax but taxes only the excess
of interest earnings over the cost of insurance protection and loading.
In effect, though personal expenses are not usually deductible, per-
sonal insurance expenses are in this context charged against interest
income.
The policyholders' share of the company's investment income is not
usually taxed to the policyholders, even though the policyholders' re-
serves are credited with substantial amounts of "interest" on the com-
pany's books. Nor is there some substitute form of taxation, such as
a tax on the build-up in the cash surrender value of each policy-
holder's policy. Apart from the partial exception covering payments
other than by reason of death, the interest earned on the savings ele-
ment of life insurance policies is simply not taxed, either at the com-
pany level or at the policyholder level. Life insurance policies with
a heavy savings element, such as endowment policies, therefore offer
substantial tax benefits to investors in very high marginal tax brackets
who desire to build up an estate for their families. If such investors
have not made greater use of these forms of life insurance, it is because
they perceive even greater tax advantages in tax-exempt municipal
securities.164
2. Analysis of Important Special Aspects
A few of the major peculiarities in the Code's computation of the
taxable income of life insurance companies require critical exami-
nation before one can meaningfully assess the extent to which the
tax treatment of such companies and their capital suppliers is inte-
grated. It is difficult to consider the integration of the intermediary-
level with the individual-level tax before one has some opinion about
163. This is not to say that voluntary terminations of policies are insignificant. Dur-
ing 1972, life insurance companies paid about $8 billion to the beneficiaries of policy-
holders and about $3 billion in cash surrender values. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE,
LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 1973, at 46-50.
164. § 103 excludes interest on state and municipal obligations from gross income.
The higher one's tax bracket, the greater the benefit provided by this provision. For
example, a taxpayer with a marginal rate of 70 percent requires a 16 percent interest
on a taxable obligation to produce an after tax yield of 4.8 percent.
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what ought to be included as income earned by the intermediary.
In this subsection, I discuss three technical but important anomalies
in the computation of life insurance company taxable income. I then
turn to a conceptually more difficult issue affecting all kinds of in-
surance companies-whether underwriting gain ought to be considered
income to mutual companies.
a. Current taxation of one-half of underwriting gains. The Life In-
surance Company Income Tax Act of 1959 is the basic tax law govern-
ing life insurance companies today. One of its principal innovations
was the taxation of underwriting gains. Previously, life insurance com-
panies were taxed only on their investment income;' 0 ' the new law,
however, based tax liability on a "total income" theory. Despite this
terminology, the Code presently taxes only about one-half of each
year's underwriting gains. The official rationale for this rule is that
only one-half is currently taxed "because it is difficult to establish
with certainty the actual annual income of a life insurance com-
pany." I' To the extent that this statement means that the actual
computation of yearly income is arbitrary because of the possibility
that the assumptions used in computing adequate additions to policy
reserves may be wrong, a better solution would simply be to require
the use of what appear to be the most realistic assumptions. At the
very least, partial taxation of underwriting gain is inconsistent with
allowing all underwriting loss (except that caused by declaration of
policy dividends) to offset investment income. If the statement quoted
above means that the tax law computation leads to wildly fluctuating
underwriting gains and losses, the connection with partial taxation of
gain is unclear. It has been pointed out that many other sorts of busi-
nesses are no less subject to the vicissitudes of a fluctuating stream
of expenses and losses, but do not therefore receive halfhearted tax
treatment2 '1r Instead, extraordinary losses are not anticipated by the
tax law, but, when they occur, must in effect be spread over past and
future years' income, within defined limits.168 Nor is it clear that such
fluctuations are endemic to the life insurance business. Industry claims
of uncertain income conflict with the high degree of predictability
that lies at the heart of life insurance.169
165. See note 145 supra; Tye, Taxation of Insurance Companies, 2 TAx L. REv. 509
(1947).
166. S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1959). See id. at 7; Hearings on H.R.
4245 Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1959).
167. See Lent, The Tax Treatment of Life Insurance, in 3 TAx REvIsIoN COMPEN-
DIUM, supra note 75, at 1995, 2006-07.
168. § 172; cf. § 1212 (capital loss carrybacks and carryovers).
169. Lent, supra note 167, at 2006.
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To make matters more perplexing, the currently untaxed one-half
of current underwriting gains is taxed later (if at all) in phase three
to stock companies alone. Why this is so will be suggested in the dis-
cussion of the next anomaly.
b. The peculiar limit on the deduction for policyholder dividends.
Although only one-half of underwriting income is taxed currently, un-
derwriting losses can be fully offset against investment income.170 An
exception is made for underwriting losses created by policyholder divi-
dends; these are basically deductible only against gross underwriting
income. 71 Thus, a mutual company 72 is in effect given discretion to
eliminate the tax it might have to pay on one-half of its underwriting
gains, by currently "distributing"'173 those gains as a policyholder divi-
dend. As mentioned above, however, a mutual company cannot use
the policyholder dividend device to reduce taxable investment income
beyond the $250,000 ceiling designed to benefit small companies. 74
Why, one may ask, was this peculiar limit drawn on the ability
of a company to reduce or eliminate its taxable income by declaring
policyholder dividends? Why not allow mutual companies, if they
wish, to be taxed only on undistributed income regardless of type, in
a manner similar to the taxation of regulated investment companies
and real estate investment trusts? And why not allow stock companies,
which often issue participating policies, the same privilege in theory,
even if they would not in practice choose to offset policyholder divi-
dends against investment income? The key seems to be that Congress
was trying to design a tax that would make mutual life insurance
companies, as a group, and stock life insurance companies, as another
group, each contribute their fair share to the total tax revenues. We
find the Senate Finance Committee pondering the fact that, at the
time of its report, mutual companies accounted for 63 percent of life
170. If the gain from operations is less than taxable investment income, it is the
basis of the phase one tax and there is no phase two tax. § 802(b)(1), (2). This effectively
allows a deduction of 100 percent of any underwriting loss. See S. REP. No. 291, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1959). The Senate Report states that this is to allow companies
with underwriting losses to obtain immediately the tax benefits of the losses. Firms
with such losses would likely be small, new, and growing companies about which the
Senate Committee on Finance appeared to be specially concerned. Id. at 7.
171. § 809(f (policyholder dividends and two related items deductible only to extent
of $250,000 plus excess of gain from operations over taxable investment income).
172. A stock company also can deduct policyholder dividends paid on so-called par-
ticipating policies. Stock companies principally issue nonparticipating policies, however.
Such policies pay no dividends. See R. MEHR & R. OsLER, supra note 125, at 583. Stock
companies are entitled to a special deduction, § 809(d)(5), with respect to nonpartici-
pating policies.
173. "Distributing" may take the form of an actual cash payment, a part payment
of premiums, a deposit at interest, or an equivalent amount of additional insurance. J.
MAclEAN, supra note 125, at 209:
174. S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1959). See p. 1644 supra.
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insurance in force and 75 percent of the total life assets of the life
insurance industry. 75 The average of these percentages is 69 percent.
The Committee then laments the fact that were the tax based exclu-
sively on gain from operations-that is, on all income including in-
vestment income and underwriting gains, with full deduction for
policyholder dividends-then, on the basis of 1958 data, mutual com-
panies would bear only 58 percent of the tax burden imposed on all
life insurance companies. 176 On the other hand, if the tax were only
on investment income without any allowance for policyholder divi-
dends (as under the 1942 and 1955 formulas), the tax paid by mutual
companies would be 75 percent of the total. Apparently fiddling with
the House bill's formula to produce the "perfect" result, the Senate
committee produced a bill designed to assign mutual companies ex-
actly 69 percent of the total tax burden. One may well wonder whether
the law still achieves this purpose. If one were to average the relative
percentages of life insurance in force and total life insurance company
assets attributable to mutual companies for 1971, the resulting per-
centage would not equal the percentage paid by mutual life insurance
companies of total life insurance company taxes. By the apparent
standard of the Senate Finance Committee, the mutual companies
are now paying considerably more than their fair share.177
Other components of the 1959 Act can only be understood as parts
of a fantastic scheme to make mutual and stock companies pay their
supposedly proportionate shares of the total tax burden by juggling
the definition of taxable income. The isolation of investment income
from underwriting "losses" caused by the declaration of policyholder
dividends did not alone yield the exact percentages required. Con-
sequently, a special 10 percent deduction was allowed with respect
to reserves for nonparticipating life insurance business (or alterna-
tively, a deduction of three percent of the premiums on such poli-
175. Id. at 10.
176. Id.
177. According to the latest available Internal Revenue Service statistics, total life
insurance company assets in 1971 were 5223,246,294,000, of which S151,072,518,000 or
about 67.6 percent was attributable to mutual companies. IRS, CORPORATION SOURCE
BOK OF STA17STICs OF INCOME 221 (line 5), 219 (line 5) (1971) [hereinafter cited as SOURCE
BooK]. In 1971, mutual companies provided 51 percent of life insurance in force. IN-
STITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 1972, at 28. The average of these
two percentages is 59.3 percent.
Life insurance companies paid $1,300,054,000 in income taxes in 1971. SOURCE BOOK 221
(line 79). Mutual companies paid $896,031,000 or 68.9 percent of that amount. Id. at 219
(line 79). Thus, mutual companies paid almost 10 percent more than they "ought" to
have paid. Since the sources relied on by the Senate report are not specified, and because
IRS statistics for 1959 do not separate mutual and stock companies, it is difficult to
establish the validity of these comparisons; but it seems clear that the tax law does
not ensure the proportionality discussed in the Senate report.
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cies). 1"8 Nonparticipating policies are issued much more commonly by
stock than by mutual companies, and therefore the special deduction
further adjusted the relative tax burdens of the two groups. This de-
duction was also justified as compensating stock companies for their
lack of the "cushion" of "redundant [that is, actuarially excessive] pre-
miums" which mutual companies collect. 7 9 Congress assumed that
mutual companies deliberately charged higher original net premiums,
would be saved from disaster were an extraordinary number of deaths
to occur, and would return the excess as policyholder dividends were
the business to go as predicted. One cannot help but compare this
argument with the converse one made in a similar attempt to equalize
the taxation of stock and mutual fire and casualty insurance com-
panies. There a complicated scheme, since enacted into law, 1 0 to give
mutual, but not stock, fire and casualty companies deferred tax treat-
ment on a large part of their underwriting income was justified on
the ground that mutual companies do not have the cushion of equity
capital that stock companies do!18' Perhaps, in the congressional proc-
ess of assigning reasons for bizarre tax formulas, the end justifies the
argument.
c. Legerdemain in the computation of the policyholders' share of
investment income. In the course of the intricate calculation of tax-
able investment income in phase one, a distinction is made between
the policyholders' share of investment income and the residuum, which
is the company's share. Crucial to the computation of the policyholders'
share is the notion that the company can exclude from its income
amounts deemed added to policy reserves. In computing these addi-
tions, however, the company does not simply multiply its reserves as
reported for regulatory purposes by the assumed rate of interest used
for those purposes; it does not add to reserve liabilities for tax pur-
poses what it adds to reserves for regulatory purposes. Instead, the
company multiplies its reserves as "adjusted" for tax purposes by what
is called its "adjusted reserves rate" [of interest].18 The latter term
means the lower of the company's (1) current earnings rate on its earn-
ing assets (which in value usually exceed reserve liabilities) or (2) the
average of its earnings rates for the current and last four taxable
178. § 809(d)(5).
179. S. RiEP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1959).
180. See §§ 828(a)(1)(B), 824.
181. See 3 Hearings on President's 1961 Tax Recommendations Before House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1948-49 (1961); S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1959).
182. § 805(a)(1).
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years.' 83 The adjusted reserves rate reflects the company's actual in-
vestment experience-its earned rate of interest-rather than the as-
sumed rate of interest it uses in reports to regulators. The tax ad-
justment of the reserves is usually downward: 10 percentage points
for each one percentage point by which the adjusted reserves rate ex-
ceeds the assumed rate of interest.'8 4
The effect of the Code's formula on taxable income is significant.
For regulatory purposes, most companies assume a rate of interest for
their policy reserves lower than their actual rate of return on their
earning assets. The Code's formula thus usually increases the policy-
holders' share of investment income, thereby reducing the company's
income tax liability below that which would be incurred were the
company's actual assumed rate of interest used. This entity-level tax-
reducing effect is mitigated, but not eliminated, by the involved down-
ward "adjustment," for tax purposes, of the company's actual reserves.
A more detailed description of the phase one computation is set out
in the margin. 85 The conclusion that the downward adjustment of
183. §805(b)(l).(3).
184. 805(c).
185. To appreciate the points in the text it is useful to understand the mechanics
of computing taxable investment income. One first calculates gross income in the form
of dividends, interest, rents, royalties, certain trade or business income, short term capital
gains, and the like, § 804(b), minus various investment-related expenses and deductions,
§ 804(c)(l)-(5). The resulting figure is the company's "investment yield." § 804(c). Ig-
noring the excess of net long term capital gains over net short term capital losses, cf.
§ 802(a)(2), the taxable investment income is the life insurance company's share of each
item of investment yield (including tax-exempt interest, partially tax-exempt interest,
and dividends received) reduced by the company's share of the exclusion or deduction
for any totally or partially tax-exempt interest and dividends received. § 804(a)(2).
Thus if the company's share of each item is to be 20 percent, then it can allocate
only 20 percent of each item of tax-exempt interest it receives to itself. Eight) percent
is credited to the policyholders (who are not taxed on the income, whether or not it
is from a tax-exempt source). This item-by-item treatment prevents the company from
arbitrarily allocating all tax-exempt income to itself rather than to the policyholders,
thus reducing its taxes substantially. This provision was perhaps the most controversial
aspect of the 1959 act. See J. MACLEAN, supra note 125, at 533-34. A constitutional
challenge to this provision was rejected. United States v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 381 U.S.
233 (1965).
The company's share of each item of investment yield is determined by what remains
after excluding the policyholders' share. See § 804(a)(1). The policyholders' share is the
percentage obtained by dividing "policy and other contract requirements" by (total)
investment yield. Id.
The term "policy and other contract requirements" refers to the amount of invest-
ment income the company is considered to have set aside to meet policy requirements.
In other words, the term means the amounts it must add to its policy reserves, plus
the amount of interest it must pay on other sorts of obligations, eg., on bonds that
the company has issued. § 805(a). To compute the amount deemed added to its policy
reserves, one separates qualified pension plan reserves, § 805(a)(2), and "other" reserves.
§ 805(a)(1). As indicated previously, the amount set aside for the general or "other"
reserves is determined by multiplying the company's reserves, "adjusted" for tax pur-
poses, by what is called the "adjusted reserves rate" [of interest]. This rate is defined,§ 805(b)(1), as the lower of the company's "current earnings rate," see § 805(b)(2), on
its earning "assets," § 805(b)(4), or its "average earnings rate," that is, the average of
irs current earnings rates for the current and last four taxable years, § 805(b)(3).
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reserves inadequately compensates for the favorable tax effect of using
the adjusted reserves rate does not depend on the particular numbers
chosen for the example. State regulators are unlikely to allow a com-
pany to assume on its books a rate of interest for reserve purposes
higher than its actual earning rate. There is no feasible situation
in which the statute's recomputation strategy would cut the other
way and increase taxes.1 8 6 At least two of the Senators on the Fi-
nance Committee at the time of its report on the 1959 Act perceived
all of this clearly, and strenuously objected to the recomputation
procedure.187
Two reasons, one true and one bogus, have been advanced for the
Code's formula. The first is a desire not to discriminate against con-
An example will illustrate how these concepts work.
Assume a life insurance company that pays no interest on bonds or similar obliga-
tions and that administers no pension plan. It has a total investment yield of $3,000,000,
none of which is attributable to tax-exempt interest, partially tax-exempt interest, or
dividends received from other corporations. The mean of its life insurance reserves at the
beginning and end of the year is $60,000,000. Its average assumed rate of interest is
2.4 percent. Its earnings rate has been steady at 3.5 percent for five years, so its "ad-
justed reserves rate" is 3.5 percent. If the law were to allow the company to exclude
from its taxable investment income, for tax purposes, the amount which, for regulatory
purposes, is considered added to policy reserves, the company could exclude S1,440,000
(that is, $60,000,000 times 2.4 percent of its investment yield). It would have $1,560,000
taxable investment income.
However, the actual computations are less straightforward. The company first adjusts
its $60,000,000 of reserves as follows: the amount of reserves is multiplied by a per-
centage which equals (1) I00 percent increased by (2) 10 times the average assumed
rate of interest (for the above exemple, 10 times 2.4 percent or 24 percent) and decreased
by (3) 10 times the adjusted reserve rate (here, 10 times 3.5 percent, or 35 percent).
In other words, the $60,000,000 of reserves are multiplied by 89 percent to yield adjusted
reserves of $53,400,000. The adjusted reserves are then multiplied by 3.5 percent, the
adjusted reserves rate, to yield $1,869,000, which is the policyholders' share. Their share
is excluded from the company's investment income of $3,000,000. (Technically, each
item of investment yield is multiplied by 1,869,000/3,000,000 and the results added; but,
under the assumption that the company had no tax-exempt interest or dividends, the
result is the same). The company thus has taxable investment income of SI,131,000.
This amount is substantially less than the amount of taxable investment income de-
rived by the use of unadjusted reserves and the unadjusted assumed rate of interest.
186. The lower tax given by the Code's formula, as compared to a formula based
on reported reserves and assumed interest rates, must not be confused with the tax
yielded by the Code's formula as compared to a tax based on unadjusted reserves and
earned rate. The latter comparison reveals that the Code's formula is quite sensitive to
changes in the company's earned rate of interest.
In general, as the adjusted reserves rate (the lower of current or average earnings
rates) increases, the company's share of total net investment income increases. In periods
of quickly rising interest rates and slowly rising or stable assumed rates, the company
is taxed on a higher proportion of investment income.
Assume a company with $100,000 of earnings assets, $80,000 of reserves, an assumed
rate of three percent and an adjusted reserves (earnings) rate of five percent. Its share
of the investment income is about 36 percent, given the Code formula for adjusting
reserves. If its adjusted reserves (earnings) rate were seven percent, its share of invest-
ment income would be about 52 percent. Given a trend to higher interest rates, one
would expect companies to begin complaining to Congress about the formula. Notice
that there is some lag in the effect of changing interest yields because the adjusted
reserves rate is the lower of the current or average (five year) earnings rate.
187. S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 128-30 (1959).
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servative companies."' None of the schemes enacted since 1921 has
allowed a company to calculate the "policyholders' share" of its in-
vestment income by simply multiplying the company's actual policy re-
serves by the interest rate which the particular company actually as-
sumed in computing its reserves for state regulatory purposes. Such
an apparently straightforward method was never adopted in most states
because companies can choose their assumed rates of interest as long as
they do not exceed a statutory ceiling. Given this fact, legislators feared
that the use of each company's assumed rates for tax purposes would
cause an intolerable amount of "discrimination" between certain sorts
of companies. Conservative companies assume a lower rate of interest,
virtuously creating larger reserves. Larger reserves are, allegedly, "safer"
for the policyholders, since various kinds of regulatory restraints are
measured in terms of reserves.'8 9 Yet if the company's actual average
assumed rate of interest is to be the basis for determining the policy-
holders' share of investment income, such virtuous companies will
bear a greater tax burden than less scrupulous competitors.
On the other hand, a percentage rate of interest for reserves fixed
by a federal tax statute might, depending on the percentage chosen,
have the reverse kind of discriminatory effect. In any event a fixed
rate was apt to become quickly out of touch with reality and to yield
a "policyholders' share" that did not reflect the amount which by
a sound actuarial analysis ought to have been regarded as set aside
to meet future policy requirements. Weighting a fixed rate by industry
average interest requirements on reserves (as under the 1942 formula)
could mitigate this discrepancy somewhat, but not enough to ensure
a correspondence between the amount of investment income a par-
ticular company "really" needs to set aside to meet its policy require-
ments and the amount the company is deemed to have set aside for
tax purposes.
The 1959 approach can be seen as a rhetorical step toward effecting
this correspondence. Indeed, the second basic justification offered for
the Code formula was based on the belief that in the long run the
competitive market would force life insurance companies to price
their premiums on the assumption that the policyholders' reserves
188. See Hearings on H.R. 4245 Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 40, 81-82, 92, 245, 425, 643 (1959). Conservative companies are ones which assume
a lower interest rate and therefore have higher reserves. Id. at 643.
189. See p. 1639 supra. I use the word "allegedly" because the use of actual
policy reserves in determining solvency is of questionable validity. See J. MACLFAN, supra
note 125, at 126-31.
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would be built up for them at a rate equal to the company's actual
rate of return on all its earning assets. 190
Substantial criticisms can be leveled against this "perfect competi-
tion" rationale for the Code formula. There is abundant evidence
that price competition at the retail level in the sale of life insurance
policies is decidedly imperfect-91-apparently because of ignorance and
confusion on the part of many consumers-and no substantial improve-
ment is foreseeable. 192 There is theoretical disagreement over the best
way to take account of the time value of money, the uncertainty of
the amount of future dividends on policies, and other factors.'93 Yet
by using any of a number of methods which meet the basic conditions
of a rational price comparison (such as discounting future benefits and
outlays to present values instead of simply adding them up), the prices
of comparable life insurance policies offered by various companies dif-
fer enormously. Moreover, the price rankings of the various companies
do not vary significantly from one rational method to another. 194 Al-
though the wide price disparities at least suggest that the companies
are not engaged in price fixing, they also negate a belief in perfect
competition among life insurance companies; 95 in a state of perfect
competition no seller would have the power to deviate significantly
or at length from the market price for any substantial period of time.
In the second place, the perfect competition argument fails, even
theoretically, to explain the particular formula in the Code. While
competition may force companies to price policies in the realistic be-
190. S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959).
191. See J. BELTH, THE RETAIL PRICE STRUCTURE IN AiiERICAN LIFE INSURANCE (1967);
Belth , Maxwell, The State of Competition in the Life Insurance Industry, 15 ANTITRUST
BULL. 213 (1970). Cf. Hearings on the Life Insurance Industry Before the Subcomin. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 720-48
(1973) (report of special committee on life insurance costs); id. at 1515-1903 (statement
of Herbert Denenberg, Pennsylvania Insurance Comm'r, together with material submitted
for the record). For example, in a popular report of a price comparison survey of the
75 largest companies (done according to the interest-adjusted cost method advocated
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners), it was found that the cost per
$1,000 of insurance of a $10,000 participating policy bought by a man at the age of
25 years and surrendered at the end of 10 years ranged from $3.15 to $9.12. Inter-
mediate prices were fairly evenly represented, and similar spreads existed for other
types of policies. Life Insurance: How Costs Compare, Company by Company, CHANGING
TIMs, June 1974, at 25, 27.
192. See Kimball 9: Rapaport, What Price "Price Disclosure"? The Trend to Con-
sumer Protection in Life Insurance, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1025, 1034-35 (expressing skepticism
about the supposed beneficial impact of mandatory price disclosure, but urging that it
be tried).
193. See Joint Special Comm. on Life Insurance Costs, Report to American Life Con-
vention, Institute of Life Insurance, and Life Insurance Association of America, repro-
duced in Hearings on the Life Insurance Industry, supra note 191, at 720-48.
- 194. See id.
195. The chief assumption here (reasonable, I think) is that the degree of variation
in product quality is less than the degree of price disparity might abstractly suggest.
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lief that they will earn more on their assets than the assumed rate
reported to state insurance departments would suggest, the notion of
competition does not tell us what the predicted rate will be in re-
lation to the tax law's concepts of income. Competition might force a
company, in pricing policies, to give policyholders credit for almost
all income, including investment yield and underwriting gain. It
might force a company to give credit for investment yield only, or
for something much smaller than that amount. Instead, Congress has
assumed that a company will be forced to give credit for that portion
of investment yield which equals the ratio of the amount of "ad-
justed" reserves to the amount of earning assets. (Earning assets are,
of course, larger than either reserves or adjusted reserves.) A claim
of such a priori knowledge bespeaks a Congress more expert in harus-
picy than many ordinary citizens would have supposed.
Policies may actually be sold at prices which imply that the com-
pany expects to credit reserves at a rate greater than its assumed rate
but less than its earned rate.190 In fairness, one must admit that the
use of assumed rates for tax purposes could also be criticized as un-
realistic. After all, there is no close link between policy obligations
as stated in the-contract and the establishment of reserves.
In summary, the statutory formula does not reflect the company's
real needs as far as policy requirements are concerned, and the formula
chosen leads generally to a lower tax than would a more realistic
formula. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine a feasible al-
ternative which is realistic, tailored to each company's experience, and
nondiscriminatory.
The foregoing analysis falls far short of a complete exposition of
the actuarial hocus-pocus embedded in the 1959 act. One other sig-
nificant provision needs examination. In phase two, as well as in
phase one, the computation of gains from operations requires a de-
termination of the excludable policyholders' share of taxable invest-
ment income (since gain from operations includes investment income
as well as underwriting income). However, for this calculation, the
excludable policyholders' share is determined by multiplying each
196. This possibility is implicit in the concept of a "deficiency reserve," which in
many states the company must set up if the net premium (the actuarial cost of in-
surance, on regulatory assumptions) exceeds the actual gross premium charged the policy-
holder. The reserve comes out of surplus. See D. MCGILL, supra note 125, at 154 n.15,
235-36.
Companies create deficiency reserves when they sell below the gross premium rates
quoted in ratebooks in order to gain a competitive edge by working on volume. The
companies are quite aware of what they are doing. Interview with John Stevenson, Ass't
Actuary, Actuary-Life Division of Texas State Board of Insurance, Mar. 14, 1975 (tele-
phone).
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item of investment yield by the ratio of so-called "required interest"
to investment yield.19T The required interest represents the addition
to reserves actually made by the company for regulatory purposes. 198
Thus, the phase two "gain from operations" will ordinarily contain
a taxable investment income element that is larger than the phase
one taxable investment income.
The phase two tax component (loosely referred to as the taxable
half of underwriting income) will actually include, in most cases, not
only one-half of the company's underwriting gains, but also a portion
of the company's investment income. 19 Very roughly speaking, this
portion represents one-half of the difference between the unrealistic
calculation of the policy requirements made in phase one and the
arguably more realistic calculation made in phase two. Only one-half
of the "excess" investment income due to the phase two calcula-
tion is taxed currently. Further, all of it can be offset by true under-
writing losses or eliminated from the tax base by an appropriate dec-
laration of policyholder dividends-unlike the rest of investment in-
come.
Why was the "required interest" approach used in phase two of the
tax computation but not in phase one? No decisive reason appears in
the legislative history,200 but an explanation may be ventured. The
197. § 809(a)(1).
198. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.809-2(d), 1.809-5(b) (1961). The required interest is defined,§ 809(a)(2), as the product of certain reserves, including life insurance reserves, multiplied
by the "required," i.e., assumed, rate used in calculating those reserves.
199. S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1959).
200. H.R. 4245, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) as passed by the House, used for com-
puting the phase one tax the interest rate assumed by the company or an industry
average, whichever was larger. H.R. 4245, § 805(b)(2). This rate was dubbed the "de-
duction rate." "Required interest" under phase two was defined as the sum of (1) the
products obtained by multiplying each assumed interest rate by the averages of the
company's life insurance reserves at the beginning and the end of the year, (2) the
policyholders' share of pension plan reserves computed under phase one, and (3) the
deduction for interest paid computed under phase one. H.R. 4245, § 809(f)(2).
In the first three days of the six-day Senate hearings on H.R. 4245, industry witnesses
urged the Committee on Finance to adopt the actual earnings rate or a five-year
average of earnings rates in lieu of the deduction rate. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R.
4245 Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 66, 92, 178, 250-51 (Mar.
3-5, 1959). At that time there was no discussion of the effect on interest rates used in
phase one and two that such a change would produce.
The Committee resumed its hearings on March 17, nearly two weeks after the first
set of hearings. At that time, however, the Committee focused only in passing on the
use of actual earnings rates in phase one. Apparently, the Committee was convinced
in its first session that the recommended change in phase one would be made-as, in
fact, it was. There was no discussion of the resulting differences in rates of interest
used in the phase two computations. Indeed, at no point in the hearings was the term
"required interest" discussed.
The Senate report is not helpful. The report states that underwriting income will
include a portion of investment income not taxed under phase one because of "the
difference between using the company's own required rate rather than the average
earnings rate as in Phase I." S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1959). But the
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required interest approach was the one used for all purposes in the
original bill; the earned rate approach and the adjusted reserves con-
cept were accepted only after considerable testimony.201 It may be
that the relevant Congressmen, realizing that acceptance of the earned
rate approach was a substantial tax concession, simply decided not to
carry it too far. The difference between the phase one and phase two
computations may also reflect another aspect of the drive to equalize
the taxation of mutual and stock companies. 202
C. Conceptual Dilemmas in the Taxation of Insurance Companies:
Underwriting Income and Mutuality
No issue in the taxation of financial intermediaries poses greater
theoretical difficulty than the question of the proper taxation of mu-
tual insurance companies. The problem is as critical for fire and
casualty companies as it is for life insurance companies. The analysis
of the issue progresses in four stages.
1. Consider first the arbitrary but well-settled world of the ordinary
corporation. The customers, creditors, and shareholders of ordinary
corporations form three easily distinguished classes whose members
only accidentally overlap. For tax purposes, customer payments to the
corporation are gross income. Refunds, rebates, and similar corporate
payments to customers are not treated as income to them but as mere
price adjustments. This result would not change, one supposes, even
if the adjustments were called "customer dividends." Creditor pay-
ments to the corporation are nontaxable loans. Corporate payments to
the creditors are either taxable interest payments, deductible by the
corporation, or nontaxable repayments of principal, not deductible by
the corporation. The parties have- a reasonable amount of freedom
to characterize a payment as one or the other. Shareholder payments
to the corporation are nontaxable contributions to capital. The cor-
poration's profit or income is computed and taxed before considera-
tion of its payments to shareholders, and such payments are taxable
report does not explain why there is a difference in the rates adopted. Cf. id. at 20
(Committee statement that phase two uses the company's assumed rate rather than
the average earnings rate without any further explanation). Neither the summary of
principal changes made in the House bill nor the technical explanation of the bill
mentions the difference, id. at 23-25, 52, even though "required interest" under the
Senate Committee amendment was redefined.
201. See Hearings on H.R. 4245, supra note 200, at 68, 178, 250.
202. See pp. 1648-49 supra. Another possible explanation is that since one of the
terms in the "required interest" equation, the number of reserves, was increased beyond
those reserves used in phase one, the Senate Committee felt that the lower assumed
rate should be maintained.
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dividends to the extent of corporate earnings and profits, regardless
of the label attached by the parties.
2. When the two capital-supplying classes, creditors and sharehold-
ers, become legally confused or merged, but customers remain a dis-
tinct class, application of the ordinary tax concepts becomes proble-
matic but can be accomplished without insuperable discomfort. This
is the case with mutual thrift institutions. The depositors are clearly
creditors but technically are also the residual owners, as are stock-
holders. Yet the institution's customers-which can be defined to in-
clude borrowers and the issuers of debt securities which it purchases
-are a distinct class. Because of the entity's dealings with these "out-
siders," it is easy to regard it as earning income. The law, however,
recognizes the depositor's role as creditor. Indeed, since many de-
positors may not maintain their connection with the entity long
enough to share in the residual earnings (as on liquidation), the law
treats them almost solely as creditors. It gives the entity interest de-
ductions but taxes the interest to the depositors and, with a certain
amount of backsliding and failure of nerve, views the undistributed
profit (income minus ordinary deductions and the interest deductions)
as income taxable to the entity, disregarding the fact that no group
of identifiable individuals has a realistically definite claim to the
fund. A very rough parallel appears in the treatment of farmers' mar-
keting cooperatives,203 the farmer members of which might be charac-
terized as legally unique capital suppliers rather than shareholders. To
the extent that entity profits are currently paid or committed to par-
ticular members, a deduction from entity taxable income is allowed, "0 4
thus achieving an integrated tax treatment.
3. A stock life insurance company, or a stock fire and casualty com-
pany, presents a new confusion of classes: the creditors are customers,
though the shareholders remain distinct. As a purely formal matter,
it is not difficult to assimilate this pattern to the ordinary one at the
entity level because the ordinary corporate pattern distinguishes (in-
defensibly20 5) between debt and equity capital. The insurance com-
pany's investment activities constitute dealings with outside customers,
and are thought to generate entity income for tax purposes. Congress
therefore seems convinced that the investment income of all kinds of
insurance companies ought to be taxed, absent special considerations.
203. §§ 521, 1381.
204. § 1382(b).
205. See Warren, The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE
L.J. 1585, 1603-08 (1974).
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But even if we assume this element away, as by imagining a stock
life insurance company which issues only very short term policies and
which has virtually no investments, the conclusion is similar. Such
a company, which basically pays out on policies with current pre-
mium receipts, may have premium receipts which exceed its adminis-
trative expenses and the obligations incurred on policies; if so, it is
easy to regard the excess amount, the undenvriting gain, as taxable
entity income, since it would be available for distribution to the dis-
tinct group of shareholders. Why would the shareholders have formed
the company, if not to reap this profit?
At the individual level, the problem of how to treat policyholders
is quite severe, because in economic fact they are both purchasers of
insurance protection and suppliers of capital to a financial intermedi-
ary. The problem is compounded by those distributions or allocations
called policyholder dividends. If a policyholder is viewed as wearing
his customer hat, these dividends can be treated as mere nontaxable
price adjustments. If he is viewed as wearing his creditor hat, they
may be characterized as taxable interest payments or tax-free returns
of loaned capital. If a policyholder dividend is viewed as first coming
out of entity investment income, it might to that extent be dubbed
interest payment to the policyholder qua creditor. If viewed as first
coming out of prior years' gains from operations, it might well con-
stitute a transfer payment from other policyholders, in which case it
could also be classified as income to the policyholder. But if viewed
as coming out of premium payments he himself recently made, it would
constitute a tax-free return of loaned capital to the policyholder qua
creditor. None of these characterizations is, I think, incontestably the
correct one, though custom may make even experts think otherwise.
Congress has basically viewed policyholders as customers, since their
premiums are gross income to insurance companies and policyholder
dividends are deductible by the companies. As seen above, 20 6 Congress
has muddied the issue somewhat by restricting the policyholder divi-
dend deductions available to life insurance companies in order to
eliminate a supposed competitive advantage of mutual companies. No
such restriction afflicts fire and casualty companies.2 07
206. See pp. 1648-49 supra.
207. See pp. 1665-66 infra. Congress apparently limited the deduction for policy-
holder dividends distributed by life insurance companies to ensure that mutual com-
panies were taxed heavily enough. In the case of fire and casualty companies, Congress
started with a situation in which only stock companies were taxed and then decided
to tax mutuals on fairness grounds. All stock company policyholder dividends, of course,
had always been treated as deductible. In extending the tax laws to mutuals, Congress
apparently just mimicked the dividend deduction rule for stock companies.
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4. Like nature, the business world leaves no gaps. Imagine a three-
way confusion of classes: the residual owners are also creditors, actual
or contingent, and customers. Such is the situation for mutual insur-
ance companies. Again, one concludes easily that dealings with out-
side customers generate entity income (investment income, in this
case). The problem is created by underwriting gain. It might be
likened to the "net margin" earned by consumer cooperatives, 0)8 a
type of organization in which the capital suppliers form the principal
group of customers. Partly on the theory that the margins represent
business done by the member patrons "with themselves," these co-
operatives are treated favorably under the tax law. Although invest-
ment income and income from dealings with nonmember patrons are
taxed to the cooperative, the net margin attributable to business with
member patrons is not taxed to the entity if it is currently distributed
each year.209 When distributed, it is not taxable income to the pa-
tron,210 apparently because it is viewed as a price adjustment.
The model of the policyholder as creditor has the least influence
on the actual taxation of mutual insurance companies. If, for example,
the policyholders of a mutual fire and casualty company were con-
sistently treated as creditors alone, the company would disregard pre-
mium receipts and insurance losses paid as mere borrowings and re-
payments, and would presumably have an interest deduction if the
repayments were to exceed the receipts. The policyholder receiving
proceeds after a fire would be taxed on the excess of the proceeds over
the premiums he paid. Conversely, the much more numerous policy-
holders whose policies expire without their having suffered a casualty
and received proceeds could then deduct their past premium payments
as a suddenly worthless bad debt. The law does not, however, treat
the company and policyholders in such a manner.
For purposes of computing entity income, the Code does treat policy-
holders of even a mutual insurance company as customers rather than
as capital suppliers. Premium receipts, viewed as received from cus-
208. Basically, "net margin" is the amount left over from sales less expenses and
payments other than patronage refunds. The terminology is a way of avoiding the term
"profit," which believers in cooperatives think that cooperatives do not generate. See
Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 13, 32 (1972). See gen-
erally Lanahan, Cooperatives, in 3 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM, supra note 75, at 1901;
Magill, The Exemption of Cooperatives from Income Taxation, in id. at 1927; Nieman,
The Proper Treatment of Cooperatives, in id. at 1967; Peel, The Taxation of Coopera-
tives, in id. at 1867; Rumble, Cooperatives and Federal Income Taxes, in id. at 1939;
Warren, Taxation of Cooperatives, in id. at 1879.
209. §§ 1388(a), 1382(b).
210. § 1385(b).
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tomers, are treated as gross income. 211 Amounts payable on policies
(or additions to reserves), whether death benefits or losses incurred,
are treated like excludable price adjustments or deductible business
expenses incurred by the company in the course of providing a service,
insurance coverage, to customers. 21 2 Policyholder dividends of fire and
casualty companies are relentlessly treated as amounts paid to cus-
tomers and thus deductible in full against entity income, including
investment income. 213 Life insurance companies, for reasons already
discussed, are limited in deducting policyholder dividends in roughly
the same way that consumer cooperatives are limited in deducting
patronage refunds: it is felt unfair to continue viewing the policy-
holder or patron as a customer after all "income" from dealing with
the insiders (underwriting gain or net margin) is used up by such
dividends.
Interestingly, after computing a mutual company's net underwriting
gain (premiums less expenses, losses, and policyholder dividends) on
the theory that policyholders are customers, the law then proceeds to
tax this gain as income to the entity. This conceptual shift suggests
several possibilities. The law could view the net remaining gain as
corporate profit because it is now viewed as being available to benefit
policyholders in their role as residual owners. Or the law may blindly
and metaphysically regard the fictitious corporate entity as a separate
taxpayer, and not care whether its "profit" (receipts less expenditures,
computed in some intuitively plausible way) can be claimed by any
definite individuals. In any event, when it actually imposes a tax,
the law has stopped viewing the policyholders as customers. If the
law still viewed them as customers, their receipt of the benefit of
underwriting gain would not be a taxable event to them. Why, then,
should there be a tax merely because the distribution of that benefit
to policyholder-customers is deferred?
The problem at the individual level can be better understood by
considering policyholder dividends. Assume there are tracing rules to
determine when the dividends come out of investment income and
when out of underwriting gain. Even as a theoretical matter, I sub-
mit, the question whether a policyholder dividend out of underwriting
gain of a mutual company "is" a price adjustment or a distribution
211. §§ 809(c)(1) (life insurance companies), 832(b)(3), (4) (stock fire and casualty
companies).
212. §§ 809(d)(1), (2) (life insurance companies), 832(b)(3), (5) (stock fire and casualty
companies), 823(a)(1)(B) (mutual fire and casualty companies).
213. See §§ 832(c)(11), 823(a)(l)(B).
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to a residual owner is indeterminate. The two roles are analytically
but not actually separable. On the side of price-adjustment characteri-
zation, one could point to the fact that mutual companies often de-
liberately charge higher premiums with the expectation that dividends
will later be paid. Yet, this fact does not make clear what the proper
tax treatment should be. Should the amount of the perceived over-
charge alone be treated as a price adjustment? Is the distinction be-
tween price adjustment and distribution to residual owner to depend
on the intentions and conceptualizations of management? On the
side of taxable dividend characterization, it can be pointed out that
the particular policyholder is not "dealing with himself." The policy-
holder dividends may be viewed as benefits attributable, at least in
part, to the company's experience with other policyholders, that is,
as taxable transfer payments; or as payments in the nature of taxable
windfalls; or as economic benefits made feasible only by virtue of
the pooling operation itself. Yet one might obdurately insist on view-
ing the dividends solely from the perspective of the particular policy-
holder, who thinks he merely paid money for a service and is now
getting a refund, without inquiring into the matrix of business re-
lationships which makes it possible.
The Code responds to this uncertainty with a general strategy for
mutual insurance companies of computing entity underwriting gain
as net of policyholder dividends yet treating the remainder as taxable
income. This solution has the virtue of simplicity. Moreover, it yields
a formal (if not economic 214) equality of treatment with stock com-
panies, since they can deduct policyholder dividends to the same ex-
tent.215 In the absence of a compelling reason to reject the Code's
general strategy, one might choose to accept it and perfect it within
its own terms, as by eliminating the taxation of only half of under-
writing gain.
The fusion of three usually distinct classes of individuals connected
with the corporation-customers, creditors, and shareholders-raises se-
rious and difficult questions as to the proper tax treatment of mutual
insurance companies, just as a similar fusion raises problems about
how to tax consumer cooperatives. The conceptually possible modes
of tax treatment of these entities depend on which of the three roles
214. It is hard to know what economic equality of income tax treatment means
before one determines how "net income" ought to be defined. Arguing for application
of the same formal rule for stock and mutual companies on the ground that "equal"
tax treatment is desirable is in a profound sense circular.
215. Although different rules apply to life and other insurance companies, the same
rules apply within each group to stock and mutual companies.
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played by the individuals is accepted as controlling. The Code appears
to give predominant consideration to the role of the individuals as
customers, by treating premiums as gross income and policyholder
dividends as deductible, in whole or in part. Yet it also appears to
take some account of the policyholders as residual owners, since en-
tity income is taxed as if it were ordinary corporate profit available
to its residual owners. The best practical solution is probably to com-
promise, by acknowledging both the customer and capital-supplying
roles of these individuals. This compromise could be accomplished by
(1) following the present Code pattern as to treatment of premiums
and policyholder dividends but stipulating a limit on the proportion
of entity income which could be reduced by policyholder dividends
and (2) integrating the tax on the entity income, as thus computed,
with the individual tax imposed on the policyholders.
D. Deviations from Full Integration
Integration with respect to the investment income of insurance
companies would call for a single tax at the policyholder level (though
perhaps withheld at the company level) on the amount of such income
which is currently distributed to policyholders. In deference to the
reserve method of accounting for policy liabilities, distributed amounts
might be defined as additions out of investment income to policy re-
serves, or, focusing on the policyholder's immediately realizable rights,
as additions of investment income to cash surrender values. Treatment
of the remaining amounts of investment income would pose a problem
similar to that of bank or thrift institution income left over after the
payment of interest to depositors: permission to allocate the income
to the policyholders, who would then alone be taxed on it, would de-
pend on whether reasonably definite commitments of funds to particu-
lar policyholders ,ould be demonstrated. In fact, the law inexcusably
departs from this pattern of integration, because it does not tax
amounts of investment income currently added to policy reserves at
all. Taxation of these additions is a prime area for reform.
The underwriting gain of an insurance company is not income it
earns qua intermediary between fund suppliers and fund users, but
qua insurer. It thus does not follow logically that a program of in-
tegrating the tax on financial intermediary income and the tax on
individual public suppliers of capital calls for integration with re-
spect to underwriting income. If, however, one believes that an entity
tax on underwriting gain now exists because such gain is available for
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ultimate distribution to capital suppliers, rather than because the
law views the entity as a taxable person regardless of its relationships
to individuals, integration with respect to the public suppliers of
capital (policyholders) would seem desirable. If underwriting gain
could be shown to be committed to the benefit of the policyholders,
it could be treated as allocated to the policyholders, and thus taxed
only to them at their rates. The law does not do this, of course,
choosing instead to tax some underwriting gain to the insurance com-
pany at its tax rate.
In sum, though the intermediary income earned and allocated to
public suppliers of capital by investment companies, banks, and thrift
institutions is taxed in a fairly well integrated manner, the com-
parable income of life insurance companies escapes taxation entirely.
V. Fire and Casualty Insurance Companies:
A Chaotic Conventional Pattern
A. Introduction
As a group, nonlife insurance companies possess a far smaller amount
of financial assets than do banks, thrift institutions, or life insurance
companies. Their holdings do, however, exceed those of investment
companies by a substantial amount.210 Most nonlife insurance com-
panies fall into the category of companies issuing property and lia-
bility insurance-the so-called fire and casualty companies. Such com-
panies are chartered under state law in either stock or mutual form.
They invest principally in tax-exempt bonds and corporate stock 217
and, unlike life insurance companies, frequently trade in secondary
markets. Their policy obligations are not as long term as those of life
insurance companies; yet, they too must rely on substantial reserve
funds because their contingent liabilities are far less predictable than
those of life insurance companies.218 Consequently, although premium
payments to fire and casualty companies are not ordinarily thought
of as savings, they do in fact contribute to substantial funds that are
invested in financial assets.
216. See notes 3-9 supra.
217. See note 7 supra.
218. In the spring of 1974, for example, a series of devastating tornadoes struck popu-
lated areas of the midwestern United States with such fury that the resulting damage
claims totalled $450 million. This sum was the single highest insured loss absorbed by
the American fire and casualty industry in a decade, and one of the worst losses in
the history of the industry. Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1975, at I, col. 6. Unfortunately, this
was also a time when the industry's stock market holdings were declining in value.
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B. Present Tax Treatment
1. Stock and Ordinary Mutual Fire and Casualty Companies
Life insurance companies are taxed under special Code provisions
because of the overwhelming importance of the long term reserve ele-
ment in their business. Other insurance companies reckon their in-
come in terms of a somewhat different actuarial jargon. 219 As with
life insurance companies, the income of fire and casualty companies
can be seen as the composite of investment and underwriting income.
There is a kind of distant correlative to the exclusion for additions
to policy reserves in the notion that premiums are income to fire and
casualty companies only when "earned."2 20
In general, the two sets of provisions in the Internal Revenue Code
which deal specifically with property and liability insurers (§§ 831-832
and 821-826) govern companies which are organized as stock companies
and as mutual companies, respectively.221 At one time there were sig-
nificant differences in the tax treatment of the two types of com-
panies. 222 The discrepancy has been partly reduced, however, by a sys-
tem of statutory cross-references which results in a bizarre pattern.
Small mutual companies still receive special treatment, and there is
one significant computational advantage 223 available to all mutuals
having positive underwriting income. Fire and casualty companies op-
erate under a harsher federal income tax regime than do life insurance
219. The major liabilities of fire and casualty companies also are referred to as
reserves, but the major types of reserves are differently termed. Two major types of
reserves usually are mandated by statute. The "unearned premium reserve" measures
the company's obligations to the policyholder at every point during the term of the
insurance contract and protects the right of the policyholder to cancel the contract,
thereby obtaining a return of a portion of the premiums. Shortcuts are allowed in this
calculation-e.g., the assumption that all policies written during a given year were
ismed on July 1. The other important reserve mandated by statute is called "loss re-
serves." It reflects the amount of claims that have been incurred on issued policies
but not yet paid by the company as of the date of the financial report. It includes
those claims which have been incurred, reported and adjusted, but not yet paid; those
incurred and reported, but not adjusted; and those estimated to have been incurred,
but not yet reported. Some states additionally authorize a third important type of re-
serl e, the "reserve for catastrophes." See generally Denenberg, Finance Function, in H.
DENENERG et al., RISK AND INSURANCE 409-27 (1964).
The extent to which additions to reserves for catastrophes are sound as an actuarial
or accounting matter, and the extent to which such additions ought to be deductible(if at all) for tax purposes, are specialized questions beyond the scope of this article.
220. Basically, premiums are earned when the period of insurance coverage expires.
See Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1933).
221. More specifically, §§ 821-26 cover mutual insurance companies other than life
insurance compamies, certain marine insurance companies, and those fire or flood in-
surance companies which operate on the basis of perpetual policies or premium deposits.
Sections 831-32 cover "insurance companies (other than life or mutual), mutual marine
insurance companies, and certain mutual fire or flood insurance companies."
222. See H.R. RP. No. 1447, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1962).
223. See pp. 1669-71 infra.
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companies, as is evidenced by the relative abundance of tax-exempt
municipal securities in their portfolios. 224 The principal reason for
this greater severity in tax treatment is the treatment of all investment
income and underwriting gain (other than a special deferred portion
of mutual companies' underwriting gain) as taxable entity income. On
the other hand, not only can regular underwriting losses offset invest-
ment income, but policyholder dividends can be deducted without
limit, even against investment income.
The basic pattern of tax treatment of the two sorts of fire and
casualty companies may best be understood by considering the broad
outline of the Code's involved definitions and formulas. This outline
will also show that the tax burden on stock companies and mutual
companies identical in all ways save capital structure tends to be the
same under a variety of simplifying assumptions-some of which are
admittedly unrealistic.
A stock fire and casualty company's taxable income is defined - 5
as its gross income less the many deductions (including one for policy-
holder dividends) listed in § 832(c). The "gross income" amount con-
sists of gross investment income, underwriting income, gains from the
sale of certain property, and certain other items.22 6 The crucial term
"underwriting income" is in turn defined 227 as the excess of pre-
miums earned during the year over insurance losses and expenses in-
curred.2 2 8 Although underwriting income as defined cannot be a nega-
tive number, the Code definitions are interconnected in a manner
which allows underwriting losses to reduce investment income.22
As a formal matter, the statutory description of a mutual fire and
224. See R. ROBINSON & D. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 3, at 50, 52 (figures for 1970).
225. § 832(a).
226. § 832(b)(1). Note that investment and underwriting income are computed on the
basis of the underwriting and investment exhibit of the annual statement approved by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
227. § 832(b)(3).
228. It may be helpful to view the taxing pattern applied to stock companies in three
successively more detailed equations:
SICTI = GI - DC (I)
= GII + UI + GFS - DC (2)
= GII + [PE - (L + E)] + GFS - DC (3)
where SICTI means stock insurance company taxable income; GI, gross income; DC,
the deductions listed in § 832(c); GII, gross investment income; UI, underwriting in-
come; GFS, gains from the sale or disposition of property and items mentioned in
§ 832(b)(1)(C), (D), (E); PE, premiums earned; L, losses incurred; and E, expenses in-
curred.
229. See § 832(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (c)(1), (c)(4), (d).
1666
Vol. 84: 1603, 1975
The Federal Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries
casualty company's taxable income appears very different. 230 It is de-
fined as the sum of three items (taxable investment income, statutory
underwriting income, and "amounts required to be subtracted from
the protection against loss account") less the sum of three other items
(investment loss, statutory underwriting loss, and the "unused loss de-
duction").2 31 For our purposes we can regard the income as consisting
of investment income and modified underwriting income.
The investment income component is simple enough. "Taxable in-
vestment income" is defined 32 as gross investment income less the
deductions listed in § 822(c). That section parallels the deductions
enumerated in the general list of deductions for stock companies.
Since § 822(c) relates to investment income, however, fewer deduc-
tions are listed-for example, policyholder dividends are not men-
tioned. If the deductions exceed the gross investment income there is
an "investment loss."233
The approach to the underwriting component of income is con-
siderably more complicated. It is designed to achieve some measure
of equality of treatment between stock and mutual companies, 2 34 but
is also the arena in which the special tax benefits for mutual com-
panies are allowed to perform.
The strategy of the Code provisions2 3  is to use the total net income
of a hypothetical, comparable stock company as a base, and to allow
the mutual company's actual net investment income to be subtracted
against this base to yield its underwriting income. However, the un-
derwriting income figure thus arrived at is further reduced by a spe-
cial deduction for small mutual companies, if applicable, and by an
addition to a special account which only mutual companies can set
up-the "protection against loss account." This account is a book-
keeping receptacle into which the untaxed part of current underwrit-
ing gain is put.
In computing a mutual company's statutory underwriting income,
230. § 821(b). The tax pattern may be represented as follows:
MICTI = (TlI + SUI + SPAL) - (IL + SUL + ULD)
where MICTI means mutual insurance company taxable income; TII, taxable investment
income; SUI, statutory underwriting income; SPAL, amount required to be subtracted
for the taxable year from the so-called protection against loss account; IL, investment




234. See H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 222, at 42-43.
235. § 823(a)(l).
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the statute in effect requires one to go through what is at first blush
an absurd sequence of steps:
(1) first compute what the gross income and general deductions
of the mutual company would be if it were a stock company;
(2) subtract from the gross income amount thus figured the mu-
tual company's gross investment income, as defined for mutual
companies;
(3) subtract from the general deductions amount thus figured
the mutual company's investment-related deductions, as defined
for mutual companies;
(4) the result of step (3) is subtracted from the result of step (2);
and
(5) the result of step (4) is reduced by a special deduction for
small companies, if applicable, and by the permitted amount of
the addition to the special protection against loss account.23 0
The use of a stock company's total income as the starting point in
the computation of a mutual company's underwriting income might
represent bizarre draftsmanship but is easy enough to understand. Ab-
sent the existence of special tax rates and special deductions for mu-
tual companies, the result of this procedure would be to equalize
the tax treatment of comparable stock and mutual companies. (By the
same token, absent the special provision for mutuals, the two kinds
of companies might be taxed under the same set of statutory provi-
sions, instead of under two grotesquely interlocking regimes.) The
special deduction in § 823(c) for certain small mutual companies can
best be understood in the context of a discussion of other benefits
for small mutual companies (subsection 2 below). Finally, the pro-
tection against loss account can be better understood by comparison
to the "policyholders' surplus account" which life insurance companies
establish and to the overall constraint on additions to bad debt re-
serves which is applied to thrift institutions.
If one accepts the official explanations found in the legislative his-
236. These steps can be recapitulated in a formula which more closely reflccts the
Code's actual grouping of the elements of the computation:
SUI = (GI - GII') - (DC - DC' + SD + APAL)
where SUI means statutory underwriting income; GI, gross income as defined for a com-
parable stock company; GII', gross investment income as defined for the mutual com-
pany; DC, the total deductions allowed for a comparable stock company; DC', the invest-
ment-related deductions as defined for the mutual company; SD, the special deduction
given in § 823(c) for certain small mutual companies; and APAL, the deduction allowed
by § 824(a) for additions to the so-called protection against loss account. If the calculation
comes out negative, the result (which is not expressed as a negative number) is called
a statutory underwriting loss (SUL). § 823(a)(2).
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tory, to allow mutual but not stock fire and casualty companies to
exclude some of their underwriting income from current taxation
does not give mutuals an unwarranted or unfair special benefit. The
basic idea behind the protection against loss account was to give mu-
tual companies the functional equivalent of the cushion of equity
capital which stock companies possess from their shareholders' tax-
free contributions to capital, by allowing the tax-free build-up of a
special account.23 7 This functional substitute is somewhat misleading-
ly called the protection against loss account.
The legislative history is reminiscent of the reasoning behind the
supergenerous deductions for "additions to bad debt reserves" which
thrift institutions can take. As indicated previously, if these deductions
are to be justified at all, the misleading terminology of "bad debt re-
serves" must be reconstrued as referring, not to an account geared
to actual, realistic expectations of losses on loans, but to a functional
substitute for equity capital. As in the case of thrift institutions, the
congressional justification for the special benefit for mutual fire and
casualty companies is not persuasive, because the additions to the pro-
tection against loss account in fact come out of income which is the
result of operations, not from a one-shot infusion of capital.
The deduction for additions to the protection against loss account
should also be compared to the deductions which life insurance com-
panies take for additions to their policyholders' surplus accounts.238
Both deductions result in some underwriting gain being currently un-
taxed, but the deduction available to life insurance companies is more
permanent. Any life insurance company, whether stock or mutual
in form, can escape current taxation of that half of its underwriting
income added to the policyholders' surplus account. Mutual life
insurance companies are never taxed on that half, and in practice
stock companies are rarely later taxed. As seen earlier, the only pos-
sible rationale for this treatment is based on the purported difficulty
of computing a life insurance company's underwriting income with
certainty on an annual basis. By contrast, only mutual fire and casu-
alty insurance companies can escape current taxation of some un-
derwriting income by making additions to the protection against loss
account. Furthermore, the deduction basically represents a five-year
deferral of tax, rather than an escape from tax. The rationale for
237. See 3 Hearings on President's 1961 Tax Recommendations Before House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1949 (1962); H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note
222, at 43.
238. See p. 1644 supra.
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the account rests not on any computational difficulties but on an
alleged desire to redress the supposed competitive disadvantages of
mutual companies.
The actual amount allowable as an addition to the protection against
loss account is given by § 824. Disregarding a complication,239 the
amount is the sum of (1) one percent of the losses incurred during
the taxable year as determined under a Code paragraph2 40 which de-
fines losses incurred for stock companies and (2) 25 percent of the
"underwriting gains" for the year. Underwriting gain is defined for
this purpose as the statutory underwriting income computed without
regard to the deductions or the additions to the protection against
loss account.2 4
1
The conditions under which amounts added to the protection against
loss account are ultimately included in taxable income are set forth
in an elaborate list of required subtractions from the account. Unless
the basic point of the protection against loss account is kept firmly
in mind, the list will likely seem a random grouping of complex and
arbitrary calculations. The account might best be thought of as the
conceptual box into which one must throw that portion of the mutual
company's underwriting income which is not currently taxed. Yet,
since the aim is only to allow the company a tax-deferred build-up
of an equity capital substitute of reasonable size, the box should not
be of unlimited proportions. Similarly, losses in future years must not
be allowed to create loss carryovers or carrybacks but must be offset
first by the amounts in the box, which is designed precisely to pro-
vide for such future losses. Moreover, one might want to make certain
that if amounts in the box are not actually used to absorb later un-
derwriting losses within a reasonable period of time-for example,
five years-they will be taken out of the box and put back into taxable
income. Finally, one might want to prevent the company from using
the box device to avoid a current tax on investment income, which
Congress is chronically sure ought always to be taxed. The required
subtractions listed in the Code simply implement all of these policies..2 42
239. § 824(a)(1)(c) provides for the addition of a certain amount if the "concentrated
windstorm etc." premium percentage for the taxable year exceeds 40 percent. The term
"concentrated windstorm etc." includes cyclones, hurricanes and similar natural phenom-
ena, but does not include fires, explosions or riots. Treas. Reg. § 1.824-I (a)(2)(ii)(b)
(1963).
240. § 832(b)(5).
241. § 824(a)(1) (last sentence).
242. The statute, § 824(d)(1), requires that, after additions are made for the taxable
year to the protection against loss account, five successive subtractions be made. First,
if the amount of the addition just made to the account exceeds underwriting gain, the
excess is subtracted. In other words, the box cannot be used to shield investment income
1670
Vol. 84: 1603, 1975
The Federal Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries
2. Small Mutual Companies
There are three provisions in the Code providing favorable treat-
ment for small mutual fire and casualty companies. The applicability
of the provisions is determined by an index of the size of a company's
business. The index is based on what might be called a company's
"gross amount," that is, the sum of its gross investment income, ex-
cepting capital gains, plus its premiums including assessments and
deposits. The three provisions govern companies in three contiguous
increasing size categories. A mutual company whose gross amount
for the year does not exceed $150,000 is tax-exempt. 243 Companies
in the middle group, with a gross amount greater than $150,000 but
not greater than $500,000, are taxed only on their taxable investment
income, at special rates.2 44 Mutual companies with a gross amount
between $500,000 and $1,100,000 are taxed on investment income and
underwriting income, but in computing the latter they receive a small
additional deduction (at most $6,000) that decreases with increasing
from current tax. One might compare the similar results for life insurance companies:
with them, the deductible addition to the policyholders' surplus account can only be made
if there is a positive underwriting income, that is, a positive result in the phase two
computation. It follows that additions to the policyholders' surplus account cannot re-
duce phase one's taxable investment income. With mutual fire and casualty companies,
the result is not automatic because of the more complicated formula for computing the
addition to the protection against loss accounts-one percent of losses plus 25 percent
of underwriting gain. This means, for example, that if the underwriting gain were zero
and there were losses, an addition would be made in excess of underwriting income.
The second subtraction is obvious. If there is a total operating loss for a year-more
exactly, if the sum of investment losses and statutory underwriting losses exceeds the
sum of taxable investment income and statutory underwriting income-it is subtracted
from the protection against loss account. Since the account is an accumulation of un-
taxed income designed to absorb future losses, when there ultimately is a net loss from
the combined investment and underwriting aspects of the business, the account should
then be debited and the amount taken into taxable income. The result brings the net
loss up to zero taxable income, thus preventing the creation of loss carrybacks and loss
carryovers.
The third subtraction, for unused loss carryovers, implements a similar theory. Such
carryovers must eliminate the protection against loss account before they can reduce the
tax on the current year's income.
The fourth subtraction is designed to prevent income previously added to the pro-
tection against loss account from escaping taxation for an unseemly period of time.
The amount of the subtraction is determined by looking at the addition to the account
for the fifth preceeding taxable year. If any of that addition still "remains" in the
account, then the remaining amount (less one-half of the amount added to the account
by virtue of the underwriting gains portion of the "one percent-25 percent" addition
formula) is subtracted, thus increasing taxable income. Whether a prior year's addition
"remains" in the account at any time is determined by a set of elaborate tracing rules
governing subtraction.
The fifth subtraction is made if a specified ceiling on the size of the protection
against loss account has been exceeded.
243. § 501(c)(15).
244. § 821(c). The special § 821(c) treatment does not apply to a mutual company
which has a protection against loss account at the beginning of the taxable year. Other-
wise, a very large company might use these special provisions in a year in which the
gross amount of its business was abnormally small.
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size.245 Mutual companies whose gross amount equals or exceeds
$1,100,000 are taxed on all their mutual insurance company taxable
income at the "regular" rates set forth in § 821(a). The tax is roughly
similar to the § 11 tax on ordinary corporations but may give mutual
companies a slight advantage in the lower income levels over stock
companies.
Why are there all these provisions for small mutual companies? The
tax exempt treatment given to the smallest mutual companies traces
back to the Revenue Act of 1916,246 which added to the list of tax
exempt organizations certain specified mutual insurance companies "of
a purely local character, the income of which consists solely of assess-
ments, dues, and fees collected from members for the sole purpose of
meeting its expenses." In other words, the exemption originally cov-
ered local assessment-type companies. Assessment companies collect
monies from their members as needed to pay out promised benefits.
Unless the organization is very large, the payments a member must
make may vary from year to year and are not predictable in advance.
An ordinary insurance company collects periodic premiums which are
based on actuarial projections of future payouts; one's premium pay-
ments are regular and (ignoring the possibility of dividends) relatively
fixed. Assessment companies, in contrast, were based on a very rough
insurance principle requiring little actuarial expertise, and were often
"organized in the kitchen of the leading farmer of the community." 247
The local assessment companies were relieved from taxation on the
theory that they were insignificant contributors to the tax coffers and
that the burden of filing a tax return would weigh too heavily on
them.248 Many such companies were not required to make filings for
state regulators and had no accountants. To prepare their returns, they
might have had to hire an accountant, at a disportionate cost to their
tax liability.249 The very fact that the assessment companies were small
and mutual, and could be viewed as "not-for-profit," also contributed
to their special treatment.250 Over time a dollar limit was substituted
for the requirements of being "local" and of obtaining company in-
245. § 823(c). The amount of the § 823(c) deduction cannot exceed the statutory
underwriting income computed without regard either to the § 823(c) deduction or to
any deduction caused by an addition to the protection against loss account.
246. § 11(a) Tenth, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 767 (1916).
247. Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925 Before House Comm. on Ways and Means,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 258 (1925).
248. Id. See also H.R. RaP. No. 922, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1916).
249. Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925, supra note 247, at 258.
250. Id. See also 2 Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1942 Before House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2327 (1942).
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come from assessments. 25 1 The assessment requirement had proved par-
ticularly cumbersome for companies in those years when they made
no assessments, because they did not qualify for special treatment in
those years under a literal reading of the statute.252
The middle category of small mutual companies is principally a
product of the shift in the tax base for mutual companies from a
tax on investment income (the 1942 approach 253 ) to a tax on invest-
ment and underwriting income (the 1962 approach 254). The 1962 re-
vision of the tax treatment of mutual companies subjected them to
tax on their total income but continued to tax qualified smaller com-
panies only on their investment income. The reasons given were
similar to those given for the exemption for very small companies:
many of the medium-small companies were of the assessment type and
did not have to submit reports on underwriting income to state regu-
lators.255 Moreover, it was thought desirable to help "these small, often
new, companies to maintain sufficient reserves so that they can obtain
reinsurance at reasonable rates." 2 56
The special deduction granted the largest small mutual companies
may best be thought of as a transitional provision for small companies
which are on their way to becoming larger and more heavily taxed.257
The various special treatments given small mutual companies may
result in only a small loss of revenue, but the number of companies
affected is not insubstantial. At the 1962 Senate hearings, for ex-
ample, it was stated that 80 percent of the 2,300 to 2,400 mutual
fire and casualty companies had gross annual incomes below $75,000,
and hence were in the very smallest class of mutual companies. 25"
3. Stockholders and Policyholders of Fire and
Casualty Insurance Companies
The stockholders of stock fire and casualty companies are in general
treated like other stockholders. Policyholders who in the course of
their business purchase casualty insurance may deduct the premium
251. Revenue Act of 1926, § 231(11), ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9.
252. See 2 Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1942, supra note 250, at 2350.
253. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 207, as amended, Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 165,
56 Stat. 798, 872.
254. § 821, as amended, Revenue Act of 1962, § f, 76 Stat. 989.
255. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1962); S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 57 (1962).
256. S. REP. No. 1881, supra note 255, at 57.
257. H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 255, at 44; S. REP. No. 1881, supra note 255, at 57.
258. Hearings on H.R. 10650 Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 2, at 1527 (1962).
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payment as an ordinary and necessary business expense.25 9 As a corol-
lary, any actual casualty losses covered by the insurance would not
be deductible,20° but neither would the insurance proceeds be in-
come.201 Nonbusiness policyholders-for example, an individual pur-
chasing fire insurance on his home-are taxed similarly, except that
the premium payments are nondeductible, because they are viewed as
personal expenses. 2 2 The wealthy individual may therefore have an
incentive to be a self-insurer; since a casualty loss not covered by insur-
ance is deductible, the after-tax cost of a casualty loss may be less than
the cost of buying insurance protection from a commercial insurer.2"
C. Deviations from Full Integration
There is no integration of the tax on stock fire and casualty com-
panies with the individual tax on their stockholders, just as there is
generally no integration with respect to elite suppliers of capital who
are shareholders. Nor is there integration with respect to the public
suppliers of capital, the policyholders, because the law consistently
treats even mutual company policyholders as purchasers of insurance
protection rather than as capital suppliers. Admittedly, this categori-
zation of policyholders as customers rather than capital suppliers is
not senseless.
To be sure, most of the types of public suppliers of capital dis-
cussed in this article can be construed, with varying degrees of plaus-
ibility, as something "more" than capital suppliers. Thus, savings ac-
countholders in banks and thrift institutions might be said to pur-
chase FDIC or comparable insurance; mutual fund and REIT share-
holders purchase the benefits of diversification; and, more substan-
tially, life insurance policyholders purchase life insurance protection.
In all these cases, however, the savings/investing element remains large,
and the individuals benefit significantly from the entity's investment
operations. In the case of property and liability insurance, the capital-
259. See § 162(a).
260. § 165(a).
261. The proceeds might, however, produce capital gain or ordinary loss under § 1231
if the proceeds exceeded or were less than the adjusted basis of the destroyed pr6perty
used in the trade or business.
262. See § 262 (disallowance of personal, living and family expenses except where
otherwise provided in ch. I). Note that for collection of proceeds upon a fire, § 1231
produces a possibility of gain or loss if proceeds exceed or are less than basis.
263. By contrast, medical insurance premiums are deductible as medical expenses.
§ 213(a)(1), (e)(1)(C). Correlatively, amounts received through accident or health insurance
for personal injuries or sickness are not included in gross income, unless they are at-
tributable to contributions by an employer that were not included in the beneficiary
employee's income. § 105(a).
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supplying function of policyholders might be thought so negligible that
entity income allocable to the policyholders ought to be disregarded
when computing their income.
In general, then, fire and casualty companies might be said to be
taxed according to a bizarrely presented but basically conventional
pattern: they are taxed in effect like ordinary corporations, apart from
special provisions to benefit mutual companies, and the policyholders
are treated principally as customers, even in the case of mutual com-
panies. Because of the peculiar historical evolution of the relationship
between the tax law's treatment of stock and mutual fire and casualty
companies, however, the Code expresses this simple objective in a
bizarre network of statutory language. In line with the suggestions
made about life insurance companies, the law ought in principle to
give greater recognition to the role of policyholders as capital suppliers.
Thus, it could stipulate a limit on the extent to which policyholder
dividends may reduce entity income, and then integrate the tax on
entity income so computed with the tax on the policyholder. Prac-
tical difficulties with this proposal are discussed in the concluding
section.
VI. Qualified Pension Plans: A Pattern of
Overriding Policies
Qualified pension trusts, and to a lesser extent qualified pension
plans administered by life insurance companies, have been among
the fastest growing types of investment funds.20 4 Part of this growth
can be explained by their tax advantages. An employer's contributions
to a qualified pension trust are immediately deductible by the em-
ployer as a business expense,206 but are not immediately taxed as
compensation income to the employee-beneficiary of the trust.2 66 In-
vestment earnings of a qualified pension trust are exempt from federal
income tax.2 67 The pension fund can therefore accumulate over the
years on a tax-free basis, in a manner similar to the build-up of policy
reserves attributable to life insurance policies. Since 1959, substan-
tially the same exemption from tax available to pension trusts has
264. Between 1959 and 1973, the total financial assets of private pension funds in-
creased from about $34 billion to about S133 billion, 1974 FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note
3, at 35. Of the institutions discussed in this article, only the assets of savings and loan
associations increased a greater number of times during this period.
265. § 404(a). Of course, there are limits as to permissible amounts.
266. Cf. § 402(b) (beneficiary of nonexempt trust is currently taxed on employer con-
tributions to trust).
267. Indeed, the trust itself is exempt from taxation. §§ 501(a), 401(a).
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in effect been granted to qualified pension plans administered by life
insurance companies. 268
The tax treatment of the ultimate payment of pension benefits
from the fund depends on the method of distribution. Previously, a
lump sum distribution resulted in a capital gain to the employee of
the excess amount of benefits over past contributions. 269 With the
Pension Reform Act of 1974,270 the lump sum distribution produces
ordinary income, but special averaging rules are provided.271 Distri-
butions of pension benefits other than lump sum distributions are in
general taxed like annuity payments: taxable gain and return of capital
elements are both pro rated over the payout period 272
Although the tax law governing qualified pension plans is extremely
complex, from the standpoint of the theme of this article they present
a very simple pattern. Since there is no federal income tax at all on
the income generated by these plans, there is no need to consider
whether the intermediary-level tax is integrated with the personal-level
tax. Moreover, it seems clear that Congress's decision to exempt the
investment earnings of these plans from current taxation was de-
liberately made, on the theory that the tax law ought to give unique
treatment to these plans in order to encourage provision for retire-
ment. In the face of this overriding nontax policy determination, it
would be futile to object that pension plans are given an unfair special
advantage as compared to other financial intermediaries.
Conclusion: A Program for Reform
The preceding analyses suggest certain changes in existing law. De-
pending on the intermediary, the changes affect one or more steps
in the process of computing and taxing financial intermediary income
according to the model of fullest feasible integration of the inter-
mediary-level tax ind the tax on public suppliers of capital. Those
steps include the computation of income earned by the intermediary,
the taxation of distributed income, the taxation of undistributed but
268. See § 805(a)(2), (d). In computing policy and other contract liability requirements
-for which the company gets a deduction-unadjusted pension plan reserves are mul-
tiplied by the current earnings rate. The effect is to give the company a deduction for
virtually all investment earnings allocable to pension plan accounts.
269. § 402(a)(2), as amended, Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-792, § 4(c), 76 Stat. 825.
270. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829.
271. § 402(c), as amended, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-406, § 2005(a), 88 Stat. 987.
272. § 402(a)(l).
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allocated income, the taxation of undistributed and unallocated in-
come, and basis adjustments.
Regulated investment companies and real estate investment trusts
should continue computing their income as they now do. Currently
distributed income should be taxed as it now is, but consideration
should be given to withholding a part of the shareholders' tax at the
entity level. All of the undistributed income of both types of inter-
mediaries should be taxed as the undistributed capital gain income
of regulated investment companies is-that is, according to the stan-
dard Carter Commission method of integration. Such a change would
eliminate the need for the 90 percent current distribution require-
ment, which uselessly restricts the investment and growth strategies
open to these socially desirable investment vehicles.
When computing their income, both banks and thrift institutions
should be required to limit their allowable additions to bad debt re-
serves on the basis of a moving average experience formula. The al-
ternative computational methods should be abolished over a transi-
tional period. The interest income earned by depositors at these in-
stitutions may be considered currently distributed to them whether
or not it is withdrawn.27 3 It is therefore correctly taxed to the de-
positors and deductible by the institution. One administrative change
meriting serious consideration would be the withholding of the deposi-
tors' tax by the institution. The Carter Commission technique of per-
mitting the corporation to allocate currently undistributed income to
the shareholders, thereby allowing the income to be taxed at their
(often lower) rates, would indicate that banks and thrift institutions
should be permitted to allocate undistributed income to their public
suppliers of capital (the depositors)27 4 ; however, current practices do
273. Interest earned on time deposits presents a technical problem: though at any
given time the depositor may have earned a given amount of interest, under cjrrent
regulations he will have to forfeit some of the interest if he demands withdrawal of
his funds before the stipulated maturity date. This problem can be resolved by treating
all interest earned at the end of the time depositor's taxable year as distributed to
him and allowing him to claim a deduction in a subsequent year for the amount of
any forfeiture of interest caused by early withdrawal.
274. One problem not dealt with in the text is whether the character of the income
computed at the entity level ought to flow through to depositors. Should a bank, for
example, be able to allocate its undistributed capital gain income as such to its de-
positors, who would then be taxed on it at capital gains rates, just as regulated invest-
ment companies may allocate undistributed capital gains to their shareholders? The
same question can be raised about insurance companies. The problem apparently is
not urgent in the case of banks and life insurance companies, since a relatively small
proportion of their income is capital gains. Banks' gains on sales of debt securities are
treated as ordinary gains, and life insurance companies, though treated more conven-
tionally on sales of debt securities, in fact have relatively small capital gains because
they tend to hold securities for interest income. The problem is more important for
fire and casualty companies, which frequently trade stocks and bonds.
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not admit of meaningful allocation. Because of interest rate ceilings,
institutions which already credit to savings accounts the maximum in-
terest allowed by law probably could not commit additional funds to
particular depositors, even those at mutual thrift institutions. In the
absence of such a commitment any claim that an allocation had been
made would be hollow. I must therefore conclude that the present
tax treatment of distributed and undistributed income of these in-
stitutions ought to continue in its present form. I do hope, however,
that at some point the interest ceilings on savings deposits will be
lifted and innovative banks allowed to offer participating deposit ac-
counts which would give certain classes of depositors a share in earn-
ings. Depending on the nature of such earnings, the question of re-
quiring or permitting allocation of income as part of an integration
scheme would then need reevaluation.
Life insurance companies should be required to include all their
annual underwriting income as well as all their annual net invest-
ment income in the computation of their income for tax purposes.
This implies that the present scheme for taxing only one-half of un-
derwriting gains, the phase three tax on stock life insurance com-
panies, and related provisions should be abolished. Treatment of life
insurance companies' investment income is most clearly in need of
revision, since much of it is not currently taxed. Whatever the de-
tails of such a reform, it ought to implement one basic principle:
roughly the same amount currently deducted by the company as an
addition to policy reserves must be currently treated as income to
particular policyholders. Once this basic principle is implemented,
there will be no need to put a maximum limit on the amount of
investment income which a company can allocate to its policy reserves
(or to policyholders in some other way). The statutory standard, to be
specified from time to time by Treasury regulations, might be that
a company could allocate all of its investment income if it could
In resolving this question, I think one must consider what theory might justify the
flow-through of capital gains of investment companies. Perhaps the idea is that the
investment company stands as a surrogate for the individual investors who supply
capital to it and that these individual investors cannot themselves be properly classified
as dealers in securities for tax purposes. If that is the theory, one might attempt to
distinguish some of the other institutions, e.g., commercial banks, on the ground that
those institutions are not primarily surrogates for individual investment portfolios, but
are instead providers of services, e.g., the safekeeping of money. In view of the stress
placed in this article on the role of depositors as suppliers of capital, however, such an
argument seems unpersuasive. As a theoretical matter, then, flow-through of capital
gains should be available to all public suppliers of capital to financial intermediaries,
or to none. The real question is whether it is practicable ' attempt to achieve a flow-
through treatment of capital gains in the case of all finaixcial intermediaries.
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show "with reasonable certainty" that the income had been "commit-
ted" or "dedicated" to particular policyholders. Pressure would thus
be taken off the formula for distinguishing between the company's
share and the policyholders' share of investment income-a formula
which, as was seen, is difficult to specify in a way that is nonarbitrary
and simultaneously meets criteria of realism and fairness among kinds
of companies. This formula is now the dividing line between taxable
and nontaxable income; if the basic principle stated above were im-
plemented, the formula would at most be the dividing line between
income taxed at the policyholders' rates and unallocated income taxed
at a flat entity rate.
To be sure, the costs of achieving an exact implementation of the
basic principle of equating company deductions from investment in-
come with policyholders' taxable investment income may be excessive.
For various reasons, some methods of allocating to particular policy-
holders whatever investment income is not to be taxed at a flat entity
rate as residual (undistributed and unallocated) income may be sim-
pler than others. Goode's analysis,2 75 which basically accepts the sepa-
rate entity tax on life insurance companies and seeks principally to
tax the policyholders' accumulated savings, focuses on policy reserves
as the amount analogous to a depositor's deposit. Yet he is forced by
practical considerations to propose a reform expressed in terms of
cash surrender values as the measure of those accumulated savings.
(As stated previously, cash surrender values are usually slightly lower
than policy reserves by roughly the amount of certain initial expenses
not yet amortized.) Following his analysis, 270 the law could feasibly
use cash surrender value as the measure of the accumulated savings
element of a policy, and apply annually against current cash surrender
value an interest rate which would be, (1) in the case of nonpar-
ticipating policies, the contractually assumed rate, which cannot be
exceeded, and (2) in the case of participating policies, the company's
average earned rate, or, since mutual companies do not attempt to
distribute all earned surplus to policyholders, some high fraction,
such as nine-tenths, of the earned rate.27 7 The companies would prob-
275. Goode, Policyholders' Interest Income From Life Insurance Under the Income
Tax, 16,VAND. L. REv. 33 (1962).
276. 'Id. at 50-52.
277. An alternative suggestion might be to tax each policyholder on the amount of
interest credited each year by the company to his policy. Companies do not usually
credit interest to particular policies, however, and to require them to do so would be
burdensome. It is far simpler to multiply the company's earned rate of interest on all
assets times a figure, such as cash surrender value, that is meaningful in relation to a
particular policy.
Another possibility would be to employ on an annual basis the Code's present rule
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ably have to compute the amount of income thus regarded as allo-
cated and notify the policyholders. They might also be required to
withhold at least part of the policyholders' individual tax liabilities.
Underwriting gain will continue to pose a problem which, in view
of the mixed role of policyholders as customers and capital suppliers,
is capable of no solution free of conceptual tension. Perhaps the best
the tax law can do is to compromise the viewpoints. Congress could
specify a certain portion (fixed by a percentage figure or some formula)
of current underwriting gain that is capable of being reduced by cur-
rent policyholder dividends. (Once all investment income is taxed
either to the company or policyholders, it is plausible to regard policy-
holder dividends as coming out of underwriting gain). The specified
portion should probably be small, and Congress should put the bur-
den on the industry to come forward with arguments for the propriety
of giving greater weight to the view that the dividends are mere price
adjustments. To the extent that the dividends come out of the speci-
fied portion of underwriting gain, they would be deductible by the
company and nontaxable to the policyholders. To the extent that the
dividends exceed the specified portion, they would be treated as tax-
able dividends to the policyholders. Because of the integration ideal,
they would also be deductible by the company. For administrative
simplicity, all the various ways of definitely crediting a dividend to a
policyholder would count as "distributions." There would probably
be no room left for "undistributed but allocated" underwriting gain.
All policyholder dividends in excess of the specified portion would
be treated in an integrated manner and the company would have no
option. Finally, all undistributed underwriting gain would be taxed
to the company at a flat rate.
One remaining issue is the usefulness of giving each policyholder
a basis in his policy similar to that of a share of stock. If a policy-
holder had such a basis, the Carter Commission method could be
followed to its logical conclusion by treating the excess of proceeds
received on the insured's death over the basis of the policy as income
to the policyholder, his estate (if he were the insured), or the benefi-
ciary (the constructive donee of the policy). Following the Carter Com-
mission model, if the policyholder had been taxed over the years on
0
for policy surrenders, which is that the excess of cash surrender value over premiums
paid is taxable income. Any excess of the increase for a given year in a policy's cash
surrender value over the premiums paid would then be taxable income. This strategy
would make the same error that the existing Code treatment does, for it would in
effect allow personal expenses for insurance protection to be offset against interest income.
1680
Vol. 84: 1603, 1975
The Federal Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries
investment income credited to his reserves and on policyholder divi-
dends not received in the form of cash, his basis would have been
adjusted upwards by these amounts. Consequently, any gain on death
would be due to (1) past undistributed and unallocated entity income,
(2) his dying earlier than predicted, or both. The former source of
gain has already been taxed once, and given integration as a goal the
entity tax paid on it should now be allowed to the individual tax-
payer as a credit. The latter kind of gain would in the aggregate
be balanced by roughly comparable individual losses from policyhold-
ers who outlive their life expectancies. Consistently treating life in-
surance policies in a manner similar to the treatment of shares of
stock under the Carter Commission method would probably have
small revenue consequences as compared to the present exemption-
of-death-proceeds rule, and would be administratively costly. Addi-
tionally, an individual probably does not purchase a policy expecting
to die early and thus cash in his investment which is favorably taxed
relative to other investments; therefore the present rule probably leads
to little misallocation of resources. The present tax-exempt treatment
of proceeds paid upon death might be kept for these reasons. A policy
cashed in before death should also produce no tax upon surrender or
maturity if the rule of currently taxing all interest earnings is fol-
lowed. Interest at the company's earnings rate will have been credited
and taxed to policyholders on the basis of yearly cash surrender values,
so that the cash value upon surrender will merely represent two non-
taxable amounts: previously taxed interest earnings, and portions of
past premium payments that went into a quasi-savings account. Thus,
no basis need be assigned a policy because of the possibility of
surrender.
Stock and mutual fire and casualty insurance companies ought to
compute their income similarly; the protection against loss account
should therefore be abolished. Because the traditional rationale is
still valid, small mutual companies may continue to receive favorable
tax treatment. On principle, the treatment of the investment and un-
derwriting income of a fire and casualty company ought to be similar
to that of life insurance company income, although the greater dom-
inance of the customer role of their policyholders might be given
recognition by allowing a greater proportion of underwriting gain
to be reduced by policyholder dividends. Excess policyholder divi-
dends would be taxed as outlined above. Any crediting of investment
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income to policyholders that is definite enough to count as an allo-
cation could probably be classified as a policyholder dividend.
In practice, a company might find it exceedingly costly to allocate
all investment income among many thousands of policyholders who
are associated with it for only a short time. To be sure, when a com-
pany credits a noncash policyholder dividend to a particular policy-
holder it has made the allocation, but to require it to withhold a tax
on such dividends and to comply with the paperwork duties of a
withholding system would be to impose great costs on it. The com-
pany could of course be given an incentive to make allocations. Under
the Carter Commission method the tax which it pays in the first in-
stance is at or near the highest individual tax rate, so that the allo-
cations to policyholders would amount in effect to giving out tax
refunds to those policyholders not in the highest brackets. A company
would therefore find it profitable to make the allocations if it could
advertise its doing so and get enough new business to recoup its
additional paperwork costs. But to say this is not to say that the
procedure would be socially desirable.
The ultimate question is not whether individual companies might
find it practicable to implement an integration program but whether
the social benefits of the program would outweigh the real social
costs involved in its implementation. In the case of fire and casualty
companies, the costs would appear to be higher than in the case of
other intermediaries and, in view of the greater dominance of the
customer role played by their policyholders, the benefits less clear.
It may be the better part of prudence not to attempt to impose such
a program until some estimate can be made of the benefits to be
achieved and the costs that will be created.
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